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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Soviet Policy and Europe Since 
Gorbachev
One of the questions most frequently asked in recent times is: did Gor­
bachev foresee the consequences of his reforms? Was he aware of the fact 
that any attempt to radically change the structure of Soviet economy and 
the Soviet state would result in a major crisis affecting the entire Soviet 
system? I hope these lectures may provide implicit answers to these ques­
tions. For the time being however I shall deal with another question: why 
did he do it? As we try to answer we may get a clearer idea of what went 
wrong and why the Soviet Union is presently dealing with a variety of 
crises: economic, political and constitutional.
Beginning with his first major speech at the Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April 1985, 
Gorbachev denounced — implicitly at first, more openly as time went by
— the serious condition of the Soviet economy and pressed for what he 
soon came to define a “radical reform”. Considering the urgency of Gor­
bachev’s appeals one wonders at the attitude of his predecessors. Were 
they not aware of the situation described by the new Secretary General? 
And if they were, why did they do so little about it? It is my assumption 
that they failed to act for four reasons.
— The failure of previous reforms in the 1950s and ’60s made the Soviet 
leadership extremely cautious about new initiatives.
— The expansion of Soviet power in the 1970s provided the leadership 
with a useful diversion.
— The extraordinary increases in the price of oil during part of the 
1970s had a sort of doping effect on the Soviet economy and contributed 
to hide its most serious failings.
— The West, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, appeared to be in the grip 
of more dangerous crises. The debate on Vietnam in the United States, 
terrorism in Italy and Germany, ethnic unrest in Great Britain and Spain, 
Corsican regionalism in France, tension between the French- and Flem­
ish-speaking communities of Belgium, economic stagnation and the paci­
fist movements at the end of the decade: all this convinced the Soviet lead­
ership that capitalism would finally collapse under the weight of its own 
contradictions. Communism, on the other hand, although plagued by its 
own failures and shortcomings, appeared relatively healthier. Since I be­



























































































em conditions was the missile crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, I 
shall briefly recall its development.
The Missile Crisis
We still do not know whether the deployment of SS20s from the middle 
of the 1970s was originally motivated by technical considerations, i.e. the 
replacement of the old systems with better missiles, or by a wider politi­
cal objective. It is possible that modernization was at first a primary con­
sideration and it is equally possible that the Soviet leadership would have 
modified their original plans if they had been confronted by the deter­
mined reaction of western public opinion. But large sections of public 
opinion in the West, apparently, strongly opposed the idea of a new esca­
lation in the field of nuclear systems. I am personally convinced that the 
Soviet Union played a minor and marginal role in the organization of 
peace movements and mass demonstrations. But the sudden appearance of 
such movements in a number of western countries in the second half of 
the 1970s must have convinced the Soviet leadership that the deployment 
of SS20s and the ensuing debate on the necessity of a military reaction had 
brought to the surface in western societies a deep malaise. The mixture of 
pacifism, neutralism and anti-americanism which occupied the stage of 
western politics at the end of the 1970s proved to the Soviet Union that 
the West did not want to defend itself. Moscow consequently decided to 
let the western crisis run its course and diplomatic negotiations in Geneva 
only served, as far as the Soviet leadership was concerned, to kill time.
The analysis turned out to be wrong. When five countries of the At­
lantic Alliance began to deploy Cmise and Pershing missiles at the end of 
1983, the hostility of pacifist public opinion proved to be considerably 
less serious than the Soviet Union had expected, and the elections in some 
of the countries concerned by deployment showed in the following 
months that the issue was politically irrelevant. Furthermore the Soviets 
were particularly worried by an unexpected result of the missile crisis. 
The anti-nuclear emotions of the late 1970s had produced in the United 
States an ambitious military project which would make the country invul­
nerable. I refer to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Although reasonably 
convinced that SDI presented insoluble technical difficulties, the Soviets 
could not afford to disregard a military plan which would, at worst, allow 
the United States to take another “leap forward” in the field of advanced 
technology. By 1985, consequently, it was clear that the Soviet stance on 
the missile crisis had “misfired”. By then of course it was also obvious 
that the Soviet perception of the West was unfounded. Ethnic tensions did 
not threaten the stability of Western nations, terrorism had been defeated 
and the oil crisis had spurred western economies to overcome the eco­
nomic crisis of the seventies by the adoption of new technologies. It was 




























































































the Soviet Union soon discovered that oil could not be relied upon as a 
powerful “dope” for the Soviet economy and that western economic 
progress had dug a larger gap between the two conflicting economic sys­
tems. It was against this political and economic background that Gor­
bachev was chosen to succeed Chernenko in March 1985.
A Revolution “octroyée”
There were other reasons for Gorbachev’s sudden reformism. In a recent 
study on Gorbachev and Soviet society Moshe Lewin referred to 
important changes that have occurred in the URSS due to the widespread 
urbanization of the 1970s: new trades and professions, new skills and 
needs, new social groups and expectations. He is undoubtedly right, but it 
is only fair to remark that during this period Soviet society remained 
predominantly mute. Gorbachev’s perestrojka was not the result of 
growing pressure from below, was not prepared and announced by 
nationwide discussions and debates. As at other times in Russian history, 
revolution — if we may thus define Gorbachev’s project — came from 
above. It was, to adopt a 19th-century term, octroyée, granted, not 
demanded and conquered. It is reasonable to assume that some discussions 
and exchanges of opinion began within the party between the end of the 
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Natan Ejdelman, a prominent 
Soviet intellectual who died in 1989 shortly after the publication of a 
remarkable historical essay entitled Revolution from Above, recalled to 
me a trip to Siberia at the beginning of the 1980s and a conversation with 
local intellectuals in the course of which everybody sounded dispirited, 
depressed and highly sceptical about the ability of the Soviet Union to 
reform itself. There was, however, somebody said, a relatively young and 
bright apparatchik by the name of Michail Sergeevich Gorbachev who 
had recently been called to the Central Committee from his native 
Stavropol, north of the Caucasus, and was occupied with agricultural 
affairs. It appeared that this young provincial secretary of a southern 
region was meeting regularly with friends and colleagues of the Central 
Committee and institutes of the Academy of Sciences to discuss the 
possibility of reforms. This is confirmed by a speech Gorbachev made in 
1988, at the time when perestrojka was already coming under fire within 
the party for its limited results and obvious failings. To convince his 
audience that perestrojka had not been the result of sudden improvisation, 
he turned to Prime Minister Ryzhkov and recalled the frequent meetings 
they had had at that time to prepare for the future.
Nobody however knew about those meetings, and to this day it is 
practically impossible to have a clear idea of the group of people which 
surrounded Gorbachev during the years of preparation. They were, as far 
as we know, relatively young (around fifty) and as anxious as he was to 




























































































I have thus touched upon what I shall define as the generational aspect 
of perestrojka. Brezhnev held power for almost twenty years and took 
along with himself into old age an entire generation of party officials. By 
the time of his death the average age of Soviet ministers and party leaders 
was between 70 and 75. There existed, therefore, a considerable restless­
ness among younger party officials eagerly awaiting their turn. Gor­
bachev probably made use of that situation to rationalise the need for 
radical change. We may thus assume that perestrojka is not only the result 
of a reasoned analysis on the deficiencies of the Soviet system. It is also 
the attempt to confer a greater legitimacy on the expectation of power of 
an entire generation of potential Soviet leaders.
Uskorenie and Perestrojka
Perestrojka however did not begin immediately after Gorbachev's elec­
tions. At first his approach to the evils of the country was fundamentally 
Leninist. Having come to the conclusion that the system had aged and was 
not in a position to satisfy the expectations of the people, he seemed to 
feel that the modernization of the Soviet Union could only be achieved 
through the accelerated application of modem technologies to the pro­
ductive system and that this in turn could be achieved with greater effort, 
moral commitment and dedication. The approach was doubly Leninist. 
Because it relied on the miraculous performances of the new man, the 
“homo sovieticus”. Because it was a contemporary variation of a slogan 
Lenin had launched at the beginning of the 1920s. Communism — he said 
at that time — will be the result of Soviet power and the electrification of 
the entire country. Electrification was being replaced, in Gorbachev’s 
strategy, by modem technologies : those very same modem technologies 
that had allowed the West to overcome the oil crisis and leave the USSR 
far behind in the race toward development and progress.
A mixture of moral imperatives and technological innovations, 
consequently, were the therapies that Gorbachev offered to the country in 
1985. Hence the great emphasis on the need for acceleration (uskorenie), 
on the fight against alcohol, on production quality (gospremka) and of 
course on glasnost. Each of these therapies aimed at the modernization 
rather than at the “reconstruction” of the country and they all the struck 
the same note: more work, efficiency, dedication and commitment. 
Glasnost, at this stage in particular, was not designed to liberalize Soviet 
society. It was meant to subject officials in the party, the ministries and 
the factories to the scrutiny of public opinion so that they might work 
more, steal less and be generally accountable for the quality of their 
work. We may define glasnost at this stage as a comité de salut public in 
front of which good jacobins denounce bad jacobins. Or, if you prefer, as 




























































































administration all those who are not prepared to go along with the accel­
erated modernization of the country.
By 1986 Gorbachev was probably aware that gospremka was a failure, 
that the campaign against alcohol was proving considerably more difficult 
than he had anticipated, that uskorenie was not producing any tangible re­
sult and that glasnost might be turning into something completely differ­
ent from his original intentions. Hence a shift of emphasis, already appar­
ent at the XXVIIth Party Congress in February 1986, from uskorenie to 
perestrojka, that is, from accelerated modernization to the general recon­
struction of the Soviet economic system. The methods changed consider­
ably. It would not be long before new key words were heard, such as de­
mocratization and “socialist market economy”.
How should one accomplish the reconstruction of the Soviet economic 
system? At a symposium organized by the Bank of Italy at the beginning 
of 1988 a Soviet economist who had played a major role especially in the 
initial stage of perestrojka, Aganbegjan, recalled the three fundamental 
laws of Gorbachev’s “radical reform”: on individual labour (1 May 
1987), on the autonomous management of the socialist enterprise (1 
January 1988), and on cooperatives (1 July 1988).
The first law was designed to promote the creation of a bottom layer of 
artisans and craftsmen which would provide the Soviet consumer with 
badly needed repair jobs and minor services. It was also designed to bring 
to the surface, for the purpose of taxation, what had gradually developed 
as a black or “informal” sector of Soviet economy.
The second was designed to make Soviet enterprises more productive 
and responsible. They should not any longer rely on the state to pay their 
debts at the end of the financial year. They should become profitable by 
adapting to the needs of the consumer and a number of them should be 
allowed to trade directly with foreign markets. The direct contact with 
foreign partners would allow them to acquire experience and, hopefully, 
foreign currency.
The third, finally, was designed to create a network of small and 
medium enterprises which would meet the public’s demands for services 
and consumer goods, i.e. those demands which the Soviet economic sys­
tem had always sacrificed to the sacred primary targets of heavy industry.
The picture of perestrojka would not be complete however if I did not 
mention two more reforms which were introduced between 1987 and 
1988. The first provided for the establishment of joint ventures between 
foreign and Soviet enterprises and was meant to favour the acquisition of 
western technology and western capitals. The second allowed independent 
farmers to lease land from the state, to be managed as private property. 
The law on joint ventures underwent a number of changes and adaptations 
to encourage foreign entrepreneurs, and has produced an impressive 
number of agreements: 3,000, according to some estimates, by the first 
months of 1990. The experiment with land leasing on the other hand pro­




























































































people to try their luck with free agriculture if the state did not make it 
legally clear that the independent farmer would actually acquire property 
of the land. The law on individual property approved at the beginning of 
March 1990 only partially meets these concerns.
The Failure of Perestrojka
By 1988 the picture of perestrojka was fairly clear. Gorbachev and his 
advisers wanted to modernize the Soviet economy by introducing what we 
may call “market behaviours”. I have used the word “behaviour” because 
I believe that Gorbachev wanted Soviet citizens to behave as “capitalists” 
without actually being such. He did not foresee at the time — indeed he 
opposed — a radical change in the dogmatic Soviet conception that no 
individual can own means of production or “exploit” other people’s work. 
He felt that the Soviet Union could adopt the behaviours of Western capi­
talism without adopting its philosophy and that this would soon result in 
the creation of a new socialist system. To confer greater legitimacy on his 
experiment he rehabilitated Bucharin, promoted a national debate on the 
virtues of the NEP (the New Economic Policy which Lenin had 
introduced at the beginning of the 1920s) and characterized the whole 
process, with a certain amount of intellectual nonchalance, as a “return to 
Leninism”.
By 1988 however it was clear that perestrojka would not work. For a 
variety of reasons all the reforms introduced between 1986 and 1988 
were either meeting with insurmountable obstacles or producing unex­
pected results. Most joint ventures remained on paper because foreign 
enterprises experienced great difficulties with the transfer of profits and 
were generally not equipped for the elaborate triangular operations which 
the Soviets suggested as a remedy to the inconvertibility of the ruble. Co­
operatives had developed very rapidly, especially in the first two years, 
but had soon discovered that they could not operate legally in a system 
which did not have markets for wholesale products, capital and labour. 
Autonomous enterprises neglected entire lines of production in order to 
seek greater profits and thus worsened that traditional plague of Soviet 
daily life: defitsit. Independent farmers had not availed themselves of the 
possibilities offered by the new regulations on land leasing because they 
feared opposition from kolchozy and sovchozy and were afraid that they 
would be denied access to agricultural equipment, storage and 
transportation.
The time had come for an assessment. The failure of perestrojka could 
be explained in two different ways. It could be maintained that it had 
failed because it was incomplete or, if you prefer, that you cannot import 
behaviours without also importing their causes. And it could be argued 




























































































objective and subjective, from the party, the administrative machinery 
and the political system.
To adopt the first line of thought implied a change of gear in order to 
effect a more radical transformation of the Soviet economic system. To 
adopt the second line of though meant a shift from economic to political 
reforms. I am personally convinced that perestrojka failed because it was 
incomplete and logically unfounded. Gorbachev however adopted the 
second line of thought and decided that the causes of failure were to be 
found in the Soviet political system. This is why he summoned the 
extraordinary Party Conference of June 1988 and embarked on a new 
stage which would eventually result in the present political crisis of the 
Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union. I shall deal with this problem later. 
Presently it may be useful to return briefly to the beginning of 
perestrojka in order to consider the part which the European Economic 
Community was supposed to play in Gorbachev’s reforms.
Perestrojka and the EEC
The Soviet Union had constantly opposed the process of European 
integration. Soon after Gorbachev’s election however it became clear that 
Soviet diplomacy was considering a change of attitudes. Indications to that 
effect emerged from a conversation Gorbachev had with an Italian 
communist Member of Parliament, Giulio Cervetti, who had known the 
Secretary General when they were both students at the university of 
Moscow, and more formally from his meeting with the Italian Prime 
Minister in April 1985. In the following months the Soviet leadership 
concentrated mainly on Soviet-American relations but the opening of 
negotiations between the Commission and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, not to mention occasional visits to Moscow by rep­
resentatives of parliamentary groups of the European Parliament, indi­
cated that the establishment of working relations with the EEC was one of 
the political targets of the new leadership. It soon became clear that the 
Community was perceived in Moscow as necessary to Soviet moderniza­
tion and that the establishment of formal relations with Brussels was part 
of a general strategy which entailed, among other things, the admission to 
GATT. Formal relations with Bmssels were established in 1988 and soon 
after negotiations began for an economic treaty between the Commission 
and the Soviet Union itself. Formal consultations with Soviet diplomacy 
within the framework of European Political Cooperation began at the end 
of February 1989 at a dinner meeting in Moscow between Minister 




























































































The Reform of the State
I have spoken of the failure of perestrojka as it was conceived by 
Gorbachev and his advisers after the XXVIIth Party Congress in 
February 1986. I have also said that perestrojka failed, in my opinion, 
because Gorbachev wrongly thought, or claimed to think, that one could 
inject a certain amount of market behaviour in the Soviet economic 
system without altering its dogmas. I also believe that the leadership was 
suddenly seized by fear when confronted with measures that, although 
essential to the progress of reforms, would inevitably result in the 
creation of social inequalities and unrest. I refer particularly to the 
liberalization of prices which was repeatedly announced and postponed to 
avoid the inevitable inflationary effects; and to the gradual liberalization 
of the ruble, a measure essential to the success of joint ventures. Neither 
were attempted.
Gorbachev however analysed the situation differently. At the 
extraordinary Party Conference of June 1988 he maintained that the 
success of perestrojka ultimately depended on the reform of the Soviet 
political system. The party — he maintained — had developed into an 
oversize, oppressive bureaucracy which was duplicating the functions of 
the state. As a result it could not perform its original function; it could 
not act as the political and moral guide of the country. To redress the 
situation, Gorbachev said, the party must return its bureaucratic functions 
to the state and take up higher, more inspired political duties. As a result 
he recommended a return to the Soviets, i.e. to the political bodies in the 
name of which Lenin had proclaimed the October revolution. Soon after 
Lenin’s slogan “All power to the Soviets” began to echo across the 
country.
There were two flaws in Gorbachev’s thought. The first concerned the 
Soviets. It was historically wrong to speak of a “return” to the Soviets 
because they never had any significant existence except locally and 
occasionally at the beginning of the Soviet state. They consequently had 
no political personnel sufficiently skilled to take up the duties which the 
party had come to exercise from the beginning of the Leninist period.
The second flaw concerned the role of the party. When he maintained 
that the party should abandon its bureaucratic functions to revert to a 
higher political role, Gorbachev failed to see that the party had come to 
identify itself totally with its bureaucratic functions. If he really felt 
convinced that a new skin would emerge as soon as the party had peeled 
off the old bureaucratic skin, he could only be disappointed. Under the 
bureaucratic skin there was nothing.
By asking the party to abandon its bureaucratic functions in favour of 
the Soviets Gorbachev thus laid the foundations for two major crises. He 
proposed the transfer of power to something which did not exist and 
forced the communist party to recognize its ideological inconsistency. 




























































































When the communist party looked at itself it only saw a bureaucratic 
machinery. That is how the crisis of the Soviet state began.
The Crisis of Soviet Federalism
By starting a political process which would inevitably question the essence 
and validity of communism, Gorbachev undermined the very foundations 
of the Soviet federal state. Let us recall briefly the nature of Soviet 
federalism. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which in the 1920s 
replaced what Lenin had once termed the “prison of the people”, was as 
ethnically unbalanced as the czarist empire: a mosaic of nationalities 
dominated by the Russian nation. There was however a major difference. 
Whereas the czarist empire only promised more power to Russia, the 
Soviet state promised socialism and communism, i.e. stages of political 
and economic development where national and ethnic differences would 
have no significance. We are all different now — the Soviet state was 
saying to Soviet citizens — because we have been so fashioned by 
centuries of feudalism and capitalism. But we will build socialism 
together and eliminate our differences in the process. In accordance with 
this concept the Soviet state had 15 republics and one communist party. 
The republics could be plural because they represented the past. The party 
could only be single because it represented the future.
By questioning the functions of the party and the validity of 
communism Gorbachev allowed the peoples of the Soviet Union to ques­
tion the reasons for their coexistence. If communism was no longer the 
reason for staying together, why indeed should they go on being together? 
If communism was no longer their potential identity, they were bound to 
rediscover their national identities. It is not surprising that 1988, the year 
of the extraordinary Party Conference, was also the year when national 
movements began to appear and ethnic clashes began to take place in 
various parts of the Soviet Union.
The Democratization of the Soviet Union and the 
Crisis of the Soviet Bloc
I shall return to the crisis of the Soviet State. Let us now consider what 
happened in the Soviet Union after the extraordinary Party Conference 
and how it affected the other countries of the Soviet bloc.
Setting into motion the constitutional reforms which he had suggested at 
the party conference Gorbachev promoted the creation of a Congress of 
People, with 2,250 deputies, which would in turn elect a much slimmer, 
bicameral Supreme Soviet to be convened much more frequently than the 




























































































in Soviet society the ground of the electoral campaign was covered with 
all sorts of mines and traps laid out by the party machinery. But condi 
tions were also difficult for the party. The perseverance of Sacharov, 
Afanasev, Popov, and the pugnacious qualities of Boris Eltsin set 
examples that others tried to follow in other parts of the country. And in 
some of the non-Russian republics, of course, the candidates turned out to 
be national-democratic rather than orthodox representatives of the Soviet 
system. When the Congress of People convened in April 1989 and when 
the new Supreme Soviet held its first sessions a little later it was obvious 
that the entire political landscape had changed. It was not democracy yet, 
but a democratic process had begun which could not be ignored or ne­
glected.
The beginning of the democratization of the Soviet Union produced two 
results, one inside the country, the other outside. Inside the country it 
greatly accelerated the crisis of Soviet federalism because it gave a certain 
amount of freedom to the national forces which had begun to emerge in 
previous months, especially in the Baltic. Outside the country it made the 
position of communist regimes in central and eastern Europe completely 
untenable.
To understand the events in central and eastern Europe one should re­
call that during the previous two years Gorbachev had tried to export 
perestrojka to the countries of the Soviet bloc. He was convinced that the 
modernization of the Soviet economy would greatly profit by a similar 
and contemporary modernization of the “socialist” countries. He thought 
that a general perestrojka would transform the countries of the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance into a real common market, into a powerful 
economic community.
With the exception of Poland where both Jaruzelski and Solidamosc, 
for different reasons, tried to make use of Gorbachev, and of Hungary 
which had already embarked on its own perestrojka, the countries of the 
Soviet bloc resisted Gorbachev's pressure. They recognized the inade­
quacies and contradictions of perestrojka. They knew that in societies with 
a stronger industrial and democratic tradition perestrojka would reveal 
these contradictions and present the leadership with impossible choices. 
Gorbachev’s pressure ended in a sort of stalemate because the Secretary 
General could not force his allies to adopt an economic system which was 
hardly proving successful at home. The situation changed completely after 
the Soviet elections of March 1989 and the beginning of democratization 
in the Soviet Union. It was relatively easy for Honecker and other com­
munist leaders to resist Gorbachev’s pressure to introduce perestrojka in 
their countries. It was impossible for diem to go on forbidding things that 
had become permissible in the Soviet Union. For almost two generations 
the basic argument for denying liberty to the citizens of central and east­
ern Europe was “Moscow does not want it”. How could one go on deny­
ing liberty when Moskow, apparently, wanted it? How could one go on 




























































































considered as such any longer in the Soviet Union? These questions help 
us to understand the events of 1989.
Of course in the summer and autumn of 1989 it was still conceivable 
that the Soviet Union might intervene militarily to restore order in Berlin 
and Prague. If Gorbachev had done so, however, he would have de­
stroyed everything he had achieved internationally during the previous 
four years. The improvement of the Soviet Union’s relations with the 
West was a necessary precondition for the reform and modernization of 
the Soviet Union, and it was the only concrete result of Gorbachev’s pol­
icy. When it was clear that he would not intervene militarily, the regimes 
of central and eastern Europe collapsed one after the other.
The End of the Cold War
It has been repeatedly stated in recent months that the events of 1989 
marked the end of the cold war. They did more than that. They cancelled 
in part the results of the Second World War. If the Soviet Union cannot 
control the territorial and political acquisitions of the Second World War 
we are faced with an entirely new problem: the reconstruction of Eu­
rope’s political map. I will deal with this later. For the time being let us 
return to the Soviet Union and try to understand how the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc had a sort of boomerang effect on the internal situation of the 
country which was at the origin of it.
It had an immediate effect on the national fronts which had emerged in 
the Baltic countries. Before the autumn of 1989 they had tried to steer a 
middle course. They did not want to miss their historic opportunity but 
they carefully avoided any direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
They did not want to provoke Russian patriotism and were very careful to 
avoid clashes with the Russian minority and police forces.
But the events of 1989 made it impossible for the national fronts to 
pursue a policy of moderation. If the crisis of the Soviet state entailed the 
revision of the political and territorial results of the Second World War, 
if Germany was reuniting and the other countries of central Europe were 
regaining their freedom, there was no reason why the Baltic states should 
not regain their independence. They had lost as a result of the combined 
will of Hitler and Stalin. But Hitler had been defeated in 1945 and Stalin 
had been posthumously defeated in 1989. Why should they remain Soviet 
provinces when their victors had been vanquished? This is basically the 
argument which moved the leadership of the Baltic national fronts, be­
tween the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, to adopt a more radical 
and determined position. I am not sure that the argument, although histor­
ically rational, was entirely sound politically, and I believe that the lead­
ers of the national fronts neglected the economic situation of their coun­
tries. But the dynamics of national passions had been set in motion and at 




























































































The situation in the Ukraine, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia is also 
fraught with dangers for the integrity of the Soviet state. We should not 
however confuse different issues and view all these events, from the 
Baltic to Central Asia, as arising from the same causes. To speak of the 
end of a colonial empire and to think that further secessions in the south­
ern part of the country are inevitable, is in my mind entirely wrong. I 
shall try to explain why northern and southern events should not be con­
fused.
At the roots of Baltic events there is a mixture of national pride and 
economic efficiency. If communism as a general promise for die whole 
country has failed there is no reason why Lithuanians, Latvians and 
Estonians should not return to their original identity and regain their in­
dependence. If, according to Gorbachev’s declared intention, perestrojka 
entails a greater economic autonomy, there is no reason why the Baltic 
states, by far the most successful and efficient of the Soviet Union, should 
not be granted full economic sovereignty.
The situation in Central Asia and in part of the Caucasus is entirely dif­
ferent. There the unrest is caused not by nationalism, but by tribal and 
religious community feelings; not by economic efficiency but by eco­
nomic inefficiency. Whereas in the Baltic perestrojka has roused feelings 
of economic pride and aspirations of economic independence, in Central 
Asia it has roused feelings of economic fear. Confronted with perestrojka 
the Baltic wants more of it because it knows it can make it work, whereas 
Central Asia wants less of it because it fears losing the important funds 
which the Soviet state has continuously poured into the region. The ideal 
economic situation, as far as Central Asia is concerned, is probably what 
in Moscow is now somewhat disparagingly termed as “Brezhnev’s stagna­
tion”: a situation whereby Moscow footed the bill and local power groups 
distributed the money according to an elaborate but not entirely unsuc­
cessful patronage system. When perestrojka promised to end all of that, 
people in Central Asia began to worry. And when the Soviet state was not 
viewed any longer as the provider of welfare, people began to rediscover 
their old religious values and ethnic hatreds. This does not mean however 
that they want or can secede. Secession for the Baltic republics means a 
return to sovereignty. For the Kazakis, the Usbekis and the Tadjikis there 
is nothing to return to. The empires they came from ceased to exist long 
ago.
The situation is again different in the Caucasus where Armenians, Ge­
orgians and Azeris have already enjoyed, at some time in their history, a 
greater degree of autonomy, if not necessarily full independence. But they 
too are dependent on Moscow and should not forget that Russia has 
brought them into the modem era. It would be wrong to think of Russia 
and the Soviet Union in Central Asia and in the Caucasus as an exploiting 
colonial empire. It has often given more than it has reaped and has often 
provided the people of the area with the best possible solution to their 




























































































The Outlook for Soviet Reforms
What has Gorbachev done to stop the collapse of the Soviet empire? Eco­
nomically, for the time being, very little. At the beginning of 1990 Prime 
Minister Ryzhkov announced a temporary return to authoritarian plan­
ning. The move confirmed that for the time being the Soviet leadership 
was concentrating on political reforms and hoped to redress the economic 
situation of the country by the restoration of a system which, although in­
efficient, had managed to bring essential products into Soviet shops. 
Three months later, however, two laws gave the impression that the So­
viet leadership had resumed its attempt to bring about a radical reform of 
the economic system. I refer to the law on the individual property of land 
and to the law on the property of means of production. It is unlikely how­
ever that they will suffice to provide Soviet citizens with the necessary in­
centives. The law on land does not allow its sale, and the owner, as a re­
sult, remains attached to his property in a way — it has been noted — not 
unlike that of the serfs before the reforms of Alexander II. Furthermore 
neither the first nor the second law guarantee the farmer or the en­
trepreneur that he will not be sabotaged by hostile party elements. The 
new farmer in particular will have to fight with the powerful bureau­
cratic machinery of kolchozi and sovchozi, that is with people who fear 
for their jobs and will make sure that he does not easily get agricultural 
equipment, fertilizers, credit, access to storage and transportation.
If little is being done to redress the economic situation of the country, 
more is being done on the political level. Gorbachev has made use of the 
chaotic situation of the country to press for the adoption of the other 
constitutional reforms he had outlined at the extraordinary Party Confer­
ence of June 1988. He has thus become the head of a presidential republic 
and has acquired, despite last minute concessions, semi-dictatorial powers. 
In many ways these powers closely resemble those that Mussolini obtained 
after the assassination of a socialist deputy and that Hitler obtained after 
the Reichstag fire. As in Rome in 1925 and in Berlin in 1933 we are wit­
nessing the birth of a dictatorship. But whereas in Italy and Germany 
those laws marked the transition from a democracy to a totalitarian 
regime, in the Soviet Union they mark the transition from a totalitarian 
regime to an authoritarian one, that is, to a regime which may not try to 
indoctrinate the entire Soviet society and may grant wider margins of 
personal liberty. We may all sympathize with Gorbachev’s democratic 
opponents, but it is impossible not to recognize that an authoritarian 
regime is much more likely than an inexperienced democracy to avoid the 
disintegration of the Soviet state and bring about significant economic re­
forms.
The real problems however are elsewhere. Will Gorbachev be able to 
exercise the new powers that the recent constitutional reforms confer 
upon him? Or, if you prefer, will the party willingly be stripped of the 




























































































thousands of party bureaucrats allow Gorbachev to deprive them of their 
jobs and status? Or will we eventually witness a battle between the old 
party and the new state in the course of which Gorbachev the President 
tries to capture from Gorbachev the Secretary General the powers which 
are required to govern the Soviet Union and stop its disintegration?
There is of course another problem which Gorbachev must tackle, that 
of economic reforms. So far he has fought for powers under different 
forms with different methods. Sooner or later he will have to use that 
power to shape a new Soviet economy and make it work. This is the one 
field in which the West, according to some westerners, can be of consid­
erable help. To address the question however we must first consider Gor­
bachev’s foreign policy and die reasons behind it.
The New Guidelines of Soviet Foreign Policy
Gorbachev’s first major step in the field of foreign relations was the dec­
laration on denuclearization of the world by the year 2000, which he is­
sued on 15 January 1986. It was followed soon after by a “peace cam­
paign” which reached its peak in the course of 1987. In many ways the 
campaign was reminiscent of similar Soviet initiatives in previous years. 
It addressed itself to public opinions of the world and invited them to ex­
ercise pressure on their governments. It set very high, almost utopic 
goals. The denuclearization of the world by the year 2000 was obviously 
a totally unrealistic objective and recalled the days when the diplomatic 
initiatives of the Soviet Union were designed to disrupt the stance of 
adversaries rather than to achieve concrete diplomatic results. As in the 
past however Soviet diplomacy seemed to proceed on a double track: 
“popular diplomacy” on one side and a more traditional power diplomacy 
on the other.
By 1987 however it was obvious that foreign policy had acquired a new 
dimension, one that was closely related to the decline of communist 
ideology. Whereas in the past peace campaigns were designed to assure 
the Soviet Union a breathing space for a peaceful transition to the 
consolidation of the regime and the ultimate advent of communism, with 
Gorbachev they had a new meaning. They were still meant to provide the 
USSR with a breathing space during a difficult period, but they also 
provided Moscow with a new international ideology. Instead of being the 
fatherland of communism the Soviet Union hoped to become the prophet 
of a new world in which the key values would be peace, ecology, the 
survival of man and interdependence. Having realized that communism 
could no longer be used as a rallying banner Gorbachev was trying to 
conquer the mind of international society through a skilled use of all the 
social and cultural themes which had emerged, especially in western 




























































































particularly attractive to large sections of international public opinion and 
created a new variety of fellow travellers.
This new dimension of Soviet foreign policy did not affect the other 
side of the coin, that is, the USSR’s ability to make the necessary conces­
sions, once the time had come. This was particularly evident in the case of 
the Strategic Defence Initiative and in the negotiations concerning either 
strategic or intermediate nuclear missiles. The initial Soviet position on 
SDI was reasonable. It was not wrong in fact to refuse any alteration of 
the missile equilibrium unless the United States abandoned a project which 
would make them theoretically invulnerable. By developing a space 
shield, in fact, the United States were acquiring an advantage which al­
lowed them, in theory, to strike the Soviets without fear of retaliation. 
Despite these sound arguments however the Soviet Union, after the Re- 
jkyavik summit, proved to be a very reasonable negotiator. As the months 
went by it was increasingly obvious that Moscow wanted to achieve a set­
tlement and attached considerable importance to early, significant disar­
mament agreements. It has been argued that Moscow’s position was dic­
tated by the desire to reduce military expenses and free financial re­
sources for economic development. More generally Moscow was aware 
that the modernization of the country could only be accomplished in a 
climate of international détente. The West would not help the develop­
ment of the Soviet Union unless Moscow persuaded Washington that So­
viet intentions were honourable and credible.
Until 1988 the attention of Soviet diplomacy was primarily directed 
toward the United States. In 1988 however Gorbachev began addressing 
himself more frequently to the countries of Europe and made use of an 
expression — “common European home” — which had occasionally been 
used in the Brezhnev era. I shall deal with the subject later. For the time 
being let us say that disarmament, détente, the creation of an interdepen­
dent world and a common European home were die new themes of Soviet 
foreign policy. To these themes the West must respond.
The Reaction of the West and Soviet Tactics
As early as 1985 a debate began in the West on the “real intentions” of the 
major changes which Gorbachev was introducing in the USSR’s attitude to 
world problems. Were they indicative of a strategic shift in Soviet 
diplomacy? Or were they simply designed to gain time and give the Soviet 
Union a chance to overcome the present difficulties so as to resume at a 
later date a more traditional power policy? The skepticism which initially 
characterized the position of many western governments gave way, as 
time went by, to a greater confidence. When Soviet troops began 
withdrawing from Afghanistan and the Soviet government effectively 




























































































and Outer Mongolia, most western countries felt that Gorbachev’s policy 
deserved confidence.
I am not sure that the debate was properly worded and argued. It is 
based on the underlying assumption that countries have one national 
strategy and that in order to deal with them you must know what that 
strategy is. It is important, in other words, to discover what they really 
want and whether their declarations sincerely reflect their intentions. This 
view of international relations grossly simplifies the issue. Countries 
rarely have one national strategy. Foreign policies are successful not 
when they pursue one objective but when they pursue more than one, 
when the inability to attain one goal is compensated by the attainment of a 
second or third goal. Foreign policies must be “multipurpose” for another 
reason: because even in autocratic, dictatorial and totalitarian regimes, 
they are always the result of discussions and compromises among people 
with different views of national interest. We must assume that Gorbachev, 
although in charge of the party, could not launch the peace offensive of 
January 1986, recognise the European Economic Community, meet with 
President Reagan on a number of occasions, make concessions on the 
missile question, withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, force the 
Cubans to leave Angola and the Vietnamese to leave Kampuchea, reduce 
the Soviet military presence in Outer Mongolia and visit Peking, without 
consulting with other members of the Soviet leadership. And we must 
assume that agreement on the new foreign policy of the Soviet Union was 
easier to reach if the lines of that policy were sufficiently ambiguous to 
accommodate the different views of Soviet leaders.
Everything would be easier of course if the Soviet Union were a 
democracy, parliamentary or presidential. We would be able to listen to 
parts of the Soviet debate and form an impression about the different 
trends which contribute to defining the new goals of the country’s foreign 
policy. But glasnost has not, to any great extent, reached the field of 
international relations. We can only assume that the Soviet Union, like all 
other countries, is pursuing alternative goals and will always do her best 
not to prejudge her future as a great power. If we adopt this view and 
leave aside the naive question of sincerity we must come to the conclusion 
that Gorbachev’s Soviet Union has at least two concurrent objectives: to 
create the best international conditions for the modernization of the 
country and to preserve Soviet power in the world.
The first goal calls for the relaxation of tension. If the modernization 
of the Soviet Union requires, as it does, western capitals and western 
technology, it cannot be achieved in a state of international tension. At a 
time of tension the most conservative faction of the party and the armed 
forces can use the power argument that security is the primary require­
ment of the USSR and that nothing should be done to affect that require­
ment. Gorbachev consequently needs détente for two reasons: because it 
will eventually release the funds which are frozen in national defence and 




























































































To achieve a relaxation of tension Gorbachev had to give concrete 
proof of his intentions by changing the USSR’s position in the various 
regional crises in which the country was directly or indirectly involved: 
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Angola, Outer Mongolia, China, Central 
America and the Kurili Islands. A preliminary remark: never before had 
Russia stretched out so far as in the times of Brezhnev, never before had 
Russian or Soviet influence become such a dominant element of world af­
fairs. To achieve détente Gorbachev had to renounce some of the posi­
tions that the country had gained in previous years and he has continued 
to do so systematically, especially since 1988. As we look back at Soviet 
diplomacy since the appointment of Shevardnadze to the foreign ministry 
in the spring of 1985, we realize that Gorbachev drove a very hard bar­
gain and tried to minimize concessions. The magnitude of Soviet conces­
sions since 1987 is probably indicative of the difficulties he was encoun­
tering at home. He probably thought — and recent events, especially in 
Lithuania, have proved him right — that détente would make him indis­
pensable to the international community and provide him with the added 
strength which he needed to keep his domestic enemies at bay.
The second goal — to retain the status of a world power — is not al­
ways compatible with the first one. It is not easy to retain power when 
you have to dismantle a number of positions of power. If you must do so 
you should try and convince your adversary to diminish his aggressive­
ness and lower his defences. You must make sure, in other words, that 
your potential enemy becomes weaker in the process. You must avoid, if 
possible, a situation in which you become weaker and your adversary be­
comes stronger.
Gorbachev tried to achieve this result in a number of ways. As far as 
the United States and the Atlantic Alliance were concerned, he tried to 
achieve it by launching the peace campaign of 1986 and by cultivating 
cordial relations with countries which were particularly vulnerable to the 
new signals coming from the Soviet Union. When it came to Europe, and 
the European Community in particular, he tried to do it by repeatedly 
putting forward the concept of a “common European home”. By the peace 
campaign he hoped to introduce in the Atlantic community some seeds of 
dissent. By the concept of a common European home he pursued a more 
sophisticated diplomatic strategy. I will attempt to describe it.
A “Common European Home”
Like all good diplomatic initiatives, the idea of a “common European 
home” pursued more than one goal. I shall describe three.
The first one was probably a traditional ambition of Soviet foreign 
policy since the war and consisted in what was called, during the missile 
crisis of the 1970s and ‘80s, the “decoupling” of Europe from the United 




























































































itly suggested that the close relationship between Western Europe and the 
United States was the result of the cold war. At a time when the causes of 
European tension were being removed by new Soviet attitudes, there was 
no reason why the countries of Western Europe should not free them­
selves from some of the links they had contracted with their powerful 
American ally and recognize their community of interests and destiny 
with the “other Europe”. It is only fair to remark however that this tradi­
tional target of Soviet diplomacy was never pursued consistently and co­
herently. If Moscow had really wanted to decouple Europe from the 
United States, Soviet diplomacy could have played at various times the 
German card. By promising reunification against neutrality at a time 
when the Soviet Union firmly controlled the regimes of other countries in 
central-eastern Europe, Moscow would have greatly weakened the At­
lantic Alliance and the European Community. It did not do so because the 
USSR perceives herself as a world power rather than a European one and 
views European issues only as part of her global relations with the United 
States. If Soviet diplomacy were to translate the concept of a common Eu­
ropean home into concrete proposals the Soviet Union would be forced to 
accept a European status rather than a world one. Gromyko’s memoirs, 
recently published in Italian and English, clearly show that the Soviet 
Union has always considered the United States as the only enemy-partner 
worthy of that name.
By the concept of “common European home” the Soviet Union also 
hoped to slow down the process of European integration. If one considers 
the importance that the new Soviet leadership attaches to economic coop­
eration with the West for the modernisation of the country, this goal is 
perfectly reasonable. At such a time it is obviously more convenient for 
the Soviet Union to be confronted by a plurality of countries, strongly 
competing for the Soviet market, rather than by one strong, united eco­
nomic partner. All the historical experiences of the Soviet economy, from 
western participation in the first five-year plan to western participation in 
the industrial projects of the 1960s and ‘70s, point, as far as the Soviet 
Union is concerned, to the usefulness of dealing with a divided west.
There was no contradiction between this goal and contemporary nego­
tiations with the Commission for the establishment of relations between 
the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Eco­
nomic Assistance. The need for western economic cooperation forced the 
Soviet Union to grant the recognition which she had previously denied. 
But it did not prevent Moscow from trying to slow down, if possible, the 
process of European integration. In this connection it will be interesting 
to study, when documentation will allow it, the case of Austria. When 
membership of the European Economic Community became the avowed 
ambition of Austrian diplomacy, the Soviet Union remarked that Austria, 
a neutral country, could not become part of an organization whose mem­
bers were, with one exception, signatories to the Atlantic Pact. The argu­




























































































the Irish example. There is in fact a considerable difference between Irish 
and Austrian neutrality. Whereas Ireland has spontaneously chosen neu­
trality, Austria is neutral because of the Staatsvertrag. The neutrality of 
Austria, like the neutrality of Switzerland after 1815, has been 
“notarized” by the great powers. Following Switzerland’s example Aus­
tria has tried to get rid of the notary publics but has not yet succeeded in 
doing so, and the Soviet Union has a right to remind Vienna that the 
Austrian government is not free to pursue a foreign policy which may re­
sult in a violation of the Staatsvertrag. It is not surprising consequently 
that the Soviet Union should oppose Austrian aspirations. It is interesting 
to observe however that the Soviet attitude, according to Austrian ob­
servers, is not as firmly negative as it may look. Again we may assume 
that Soviet diplomacy pursues, in the case of Austria, two alternative 
goals: it will try and prevent Austria from joining the European Com­
munity if possible; and it will make use of Austria’s membership, if it 
cannot be prevented, and of Austria’s duties under the Staatsvertrag, to 
interfere with the process of European integration.
The third goal of Soviet diplomacy in connection with the idea of a 
common European home is probably the consolidation of the European 
status quo. At a time when Soviet reforms are affecting the stability of the 
Soviet state and European equilibriums, Moscow reiterates the necessity 
for a global system of political and military security. When questioned on 
the nature of a “common European home” Soviet officials in fact often 
reply that it is meant to deepen the so-called Helsinki process. They refer 
to the Conference on European Security and Cooperation which in 1975 
ratified the political and territorial results of the Second World War. It 
may be argued that it is not in the interests of the Soviet Union to demand 
what she has already obtained. But diplomatic concessions are not eternal 
and the Soviet Union probably feels that the terms of fifteen years ago 
need new signatures and fresher commitments.
How Should the West Respond?
How should the West and Europe in particular respond to Soviet diplo­
macy? They should, first of all, conform to a time honoured rule of 
diplomacy which recommends that you lower your defences and disman­
tle your strong positions one minute later than your adversary. It is per­
fectly useless to engage in a theological discussion on the sincerity of 
Gorbachev. It is imperative however not to abandon a position of strength 
before the potential adversary has irrevocably abandoned his. Recent 
events in the Soviet Union have strengthened rather than weakened the ne­
cessity to follow these criteria of internal behaviour. The Soviet Union is 
certainly weaker than it was a year ago, but the uncertainties about the 
future make any dismantling of western positions premature and danger­




























































































country in a year. This is not the time consequently, for sweeping disar­
mament agreements or generous concessions.lt is a time for gradual steps 
and general caution.
Let us now consider more specifically how the European Community 
and the Atlantic Alliance should react to the new Soviet diplomacy.
Europe should continue on the path of integration — economic, mone­
tary and political — without paying attention to vague Soviet proposals 
about a common European home. It will not be easy. There is a part of 
western public opinion which has always viewed western European inte­
gration as the result of East-West tension. As the cold war comes to an 
end — it is argued — the countries of western Europe should pause and 
redefine their common policy. They should pay attention to events in 
central-eastern Europe and give former “satellites” a chance to join them.
To this line of thought I object very firmly. The European Economic 
Community is not a result of the cold war. It is the outcome of a long 
historical process which dates back to the First World War. The countries 
of the Common Market and those which joined them in later years got to­
gether because they had leamt the same lessons from the two civil wars 
Europe fought in the course of the century. They were encouraged to do 
so by their common experiences, by the similarity of their political cul­
tures and by the fact that western Christianity had already experienced a 
sort of unity in the past, a powerful cultural myth particularly during the 
1950s. They should not review their policy or slow down the process of 
integration. This does not mean that they should turn a blind eye on the 
needs and predicaments of central and eastern Europe. But they should be 
very careful not to make European plans dependent on the political and 
economic development of these countries. We know that they are power­
fully attracted by the virtues of a market economy but do not know yet 
how their societies will react to the inevitable loss of the particular wel­
fare state established by communist regimes.
Arguments are also put forward about the advisability of dissolving the 
Atlantic Alliance. This is wrong, in my mind, for two reasons. Firstly, as 
I have said, because it is imperative to disarm one minute later than your 
adversary. Secondly, because over the years the Atlantic Alliance has be­
come a symbol of the close relationship existing between the United States 
and Europe. There may be reasons in the coming years for reviewing the 
military aspects of this relationship. There is no reason however to sever 
links which have become a source of common enrichment and a strong 
element of political stability. I personally hope that the Atlantic Alliance 
will become, as a result of the end of the cold war, something of a politi­
cal entente between Europe and the countries of North America.
I have dealt with the response of the West to the diplomatic initiatives 
of the new Soviet leadership, but I have said nothing about a possible eco­
nomic response. In fact the economic problem is at the same time easier 
and more difficult. It is easier because the business community of the 




























































































and needs no encouragement to do so. It is more difficult because any 
economic response from the West, private or public, must wait for the 
countries of central and eastern Europe to adopt clear economic policies. 
This is particularly imperative in the case of the Soviet Union which ap­
pears to be locked between conflicting economic strategies. There is very 
little that the West can do either privately or publicly, until the USSR has 
chosen a clear economic path. Any debate on the possibility of a Marshall 
Plan is futile for two reasons. Because the West would have great diffi­
culty in finding the necessary funds and because the Soviet Union would 
have greater difficulty in spending them. Does this mean that we cannot 
help Gorbachev to accomplish his reforms? In fact we are already helping 
him in a variety of ways. We are helping him by engaging in disarma­
ment negotiations at a time when he must reduce military expenses for 
economic development. We are also helping him by receiving his policies 
with greater sympathy than they enjoy in his country. But most of all we 
are helping him by doing nothing which may make his task more diffi­
cult. The Soviet Union has become a very unstable and vulnerable power. 
If the West wanted to exploit the USSR’s vulnerable points to increase the 
country’s instability it could easily do so. It has adopted a different line. 
Even at the high of the Lithuanian crisis the wording of western reactions 
was remarkably moderate and restrained. More, I believe the West cannot 
do. It can and should pursue with determination the two policies which 
have been so very successful over the last forty years: European integra­
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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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The Politics of European 
Integration
The ideas presented in this paper do not claim to be the outcome of schol­
arly research. Rather, they are the impressions, experiences and conclu­
sions of a diplomat, supplemented, of course, by extensive reading. I pre­
sent them to you in the hope of providing some assistance in your schol­
arly and political work.
But is this feasible? Is it possible to leam from history? The question 
has been disputed for as long as historians have existed. My own answer 
is, of course, yes. Every child learns from experience; why should not 
nations and their politicians be able to do so? History does not repeat it­
self; it does not run cyclically like the sequence of the seasons, but more 
in a set of spirals which keeps coming back to similar points but at a dif­
ferent level. But the hopes and fears, the passions and phobias of people 
are always similar, and along with them, the errors, illusions and mis­
takes, as well as the high points and the successes.
The history of European unification too is rich in high points and in 
missed opportunities, in hopes fulfilled and illusions lost, and not least in 
groundless fears. People place their hopes in the new, but they also shy 
away from it; they fear losing what they have and defend their acquired 
positions. Those who have the greatest difficulties are yesterday’s big 
powers. It is not so long ago that they thought they were autonomous, that 
they could meet modem requirements on size. Like a small businessman 
facing the constraint of merger, they fear losing their capability of self- 
determination. The diminishing importance of the nation State seems to 
them to be an abandonment. Ways of doing things that are comparatively 
easy for small countries have to be painfully acquired by them.
It is no wonder that it took the enormous shocks of two European civil 
wars to make the idea of unification generally acceptable in free Europe. 
But this idea would hardly have been realized unless a number of very 
special circumstances had happened to coincide.
It has been said, sometimes not without irony, that the fathers of the 
Community of Six dreamt of restoring the Empire of Charlemagne. But 
this idea is, in fact, not so far-fetched. It is certainly no coincidence that 
the founders came from the very border region which, when the Empire 
was divided among Charlemagne’s heirs, went to Lothar, stretching from 



























































































Lorraine and Burgundy into northern Italy. In the main, they also shared 
the Catholic tradition, and languages in which they could communicate: 
Schuman, Spaak, Bech and no doubt Beyen too, in French; Adenauer, 
Schuman, de Gasperi and Bech in German.
Europe of course does not stop at six, nor even at twelve. “The Six” 
though were the core of Europe and still are today, and they have no rea­
son to be ashamed of this. In the case of the Federal Republic of Ger­
many, there were other particular circumstances that came into play, too 
well-known to need prolonged discussion: the defeat, the shock of expul­
sion and sovietization in the east, the division of the country. But the de­
cisive fact was that for the first time since Charles V, Germany’s centre 
of gravity had shifted from the Austrian south-east and the Prussian 
north-east back into the Catholic west. This shift was to develop a particu­
lar political dynamism because a seventy-three year old Catholic 
Rhinelander was elected Federal Chancellor by a one-vote majority and 
retained that office for fourteen years. It is highly questionable whether 
the European Community would exist if the leader of the Social Demo­
cratic party Kurt Schumacher had been elected Chancellor in his place. 
The SPD rejected not only the Treaty of Paris — on the ECSC — but 
even membership in the Council of Europe. However this party has long 
been loyally “European”.
It has been said that the Federal Republic of Germany is a product of 
the “cold war”. This is, of course, an over-simplification. But it is cer­
tainly true that the emergence of the West German State was aided by the 
cold war. For a number of reasons this was to have decisive effects on 
European integration as well.
The idea of European unification, which was, as it were, in the air in 
1945, was initially not realized at all. The Council of Europe remained, 
upon British insistence, on the level of purely inter-governmental coop­
eration. But that cannot, as experience has repeatedly shown, provide any 
stimuli, still less constraints, towards integration. It is not only Poland 
that has been tom apart by the liberum veto. It cripples any organization, 
as the European Community too experienced between 1965 and 1985. If it 
is rooted in it from the outset, it can never cross the threshold into 
“integration”, unless, like NATO, it has in reality a hegemonic structure. 
Similarly, the OEEC, the European organization set up to administer 
Marshall Aid, was an inter-governmental body, again upon British insis­
tence and against American pressure. Despite the extremely valuable 
work which it, as well as the European Payments Union, accomplished, it 
was not able to bring about a structural unification of Europe.
This was finally achieved with the Schuman Plan of 9 May 1950, the 
farseeing idea of the brilliant Jean Monnet. America, reinforced by the 
experience of the cold war that was beginning, insisted on the economic 
and also military involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 




























































































sisted on control by the Allies of the German potential. This was the ob­
ject of the Allied Ruhr Authority set up in 1949.
But this discriminatory structure was in conflict with the American 
aims, shared by Adenauer. Monnet provided a resolution with the bril­
liant solution of reciprocal joint control. This, in its author’s intention, 
could by definition only be supra-national. On an inter-governmental 
level, it would probably only have led to stagnation or ineffectiveness, in 
practical terms, of controls, which would have been economically and 
politically unacceptable. Monnet’s brilliance lay in realizing that an 
Archimedean point was needed to set Europe moving, and then to find 
and make use of it. From this experience he developed the principle of 
functionalism. Integration covering wide areas could not, he believed, 
succeed; rather, the process had to start from strategic points and be 
pushed forward from them. On both points Monnet was, as it turned out, 
ultimately wrong; a good example of the fact that even the most brilliant 
idea needs a favourable moment.
That this is so emerged immediately with the next attempt. In 1950, 
France, again on Jean Monnet’s advice, sought once more to apply the 
functional method of coal and steel integration in the hardest of all fields 
of integration, the military area. American pressure for incorporation of 
the Federal Republic into the Western Defence Alliance was met by Paris 
on 24 September 1950 with the “Pleven Plan” for a European army, ac­
companied by the ambitious project for political union. This approach 
failed; it is worthwhile taking a glance at the reasons why and following 
on with a number of questions.
Defence, currency and fiscal sovereignty are the keys to national 
sovereignty. The tradition of the nation-Slate is not particularly old in any 
European country, with the possible exception of England. Yet the feudal 
system finally disappeared in France with Richelieu. Accordingly, one 
may say that the nation-State, has existed after all for more than three 
hundred years. The nation, therefore, was simply not prepared to dissolve 
its proudest symbol, the national army, in the melting-pot of integration. 
Nevertheless, the government of Pierre Mendes France, one of the few 
strong governments of the Fourth Republic, might have brought off the 
trick if two conditions had been met: if this had been its priority and if its 
partners had met its wishes for amendments to the Treaty.
However, neither was the case. The history of those years cannot be un­
derstood without bearing in mind that America and France had entirely 
different priorities. America, victorious and prosperous, was, since Ge­
orge Kennan’s “long telegram” of 1947, since the Truman doctrine, the 
Berlin blockade and the Korean War, primarily concerned with contain­
ing Soviet power which at that time it saw as on the advance everywhere. 
France, by contrast, fighting for economic and political stability follow­
ing traumatic experiences, saw itself facing the disintegrative test of de­
colonization. Extrication and decompression are the most difficult opera­




























































































Extrication, the infinitely difficult dissolution of a proud empire, was 
essentially effected by France in two stages. The first, centring around 
Indochina and Tunisia, was carried out by Pierre Mendes France, and the 
second, particularly in Algeria and Africa, by Charles de Gaulle.
I remember asking the great columnist Walter Lippmann in the mid­
sixties why he regarded de Gaulle as the most important statesman of the 
times. As a supporter of Jean Monnet and a European from the start, I 
simply could not see his reasoning. Lippmann answered that de Gaulle, 
with the withdrawal from Algeria, had brought off a masterstroke more 
difficult than anything in politics.
The same is true of Mendes-France and Indochina. Freeing France 
from that dreadful permanent bloodletting was his primary goal. It is 
therefore quite understandable that he did not want to employ and lose his 
prestige in the struggle for the EDC. I suspect that Adenauer did not see 
this clearly enough, given the no less strong influence of the fear of Rus­
sia on our side. We have never, by the way, known enough about each 
other. This is still the case today. In the news, we leam more about the 
West Bank or Afghanistan or South Africa than about our neighbours.
Nevertheless, Mendes-France did make an attempt, and submitted a 
number of proposals for the amendment of the EDC Treaty to his part­
ners in the summer of 1954. These however were rejected at a Foreign 
Ministers’ conference of the Six in Brussels in August 1954. They would, 
on the one hand, have stripped the planned organization of its suprana­
tional character, Germany would have been discriminated against and the 
amendments would have necessitated new ratification proceedings 
although the Treaty had already been ratified in the other countries. On 
31 August the French National Assembly then struck the treaty off its 
agenda. The EDC had failed. Ought an attempt have been made to save it? 
The question is of interest to the historian, but is also of more fundamen­
tal political interest.
Firstly, one might perhaps ask whether the alternative solution then ar­
rived at, full membership for the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
Atlantic Alliance, might not in hindsight have been the better one. The an­
swer is probably in the affirmative. From the security policy viewpoint, 
this solution was more efficient, and Europe’s ties to its protecting power, 
America, were almost certainly strengthened by it.
But how is the 1954 “setback” to be assessed from the viewpoint of Eu­
ropean integration? Was it, as many think, the great setback from which 
the integration movement never quite recovered? This is a point that cer­
tainly requires further research.
On the one hand, the question facing France’s partners in summer 1954 
was whether it was defensible to agree to a treaty which in their unani­
mous view would be defective. Can one do such a thing? Can one tmst in 
the healing power of time, or ought one from the start to insist on creat­




























































































From an objective viewpoint, the latter is probably the case; in the se­
curity area no doubt even more than in economics, for economic interest 
ultimately makes a path for itself, like a river sweeping away obstacles. 
Thus, it was possible to amend the Rome Treaty several times, with the 
merger of institutions, direct elections, own resources and the Single Act. 
Likewise, the unanimity principle that was de facto imposed on the Com­
munity in 1965 was explicitly removed again by the Single Act.
Integration brings about a loss of national capacity for action. Unless it 
is compensated for at Community level, there emerges a deficit in de­
cision-making which brings consequent economic disadvantages. But 
economic interest will sooner or later make its way through and enforce 
adaptation. However, this process takes a long time, more than is perhaps 
available in the defence area. Again, in the military area there is no com­
parable pressure to adapt. The example of the Western European powers 
in the years before the Second World War shows that even a tangibly 
manifest and daily growing danger is not necessarily enough to secure the 
requisite political acceptance for the necessary defence efforts. A wrongly 
constructed military integration should not, therefore, have been con­
cluded.
But even so, the question remains as to whether the failure of the 
Defence Community was really the historical setback to integration po­
licy, as is so often argued.
In the upshot, this question today remains a key question for European 
integration, perhaps the hardest one of all. Behind it lies the broad, 
complex set of issues of the relationship between Europe and the US, of 
the concept of the Community as a union or as a confederation, of the 
“common European home” and last but not least, of the division of 
Germany.
At this stage, it is therefore too early to seek an answer. All that seems 
certain is that the historical and the contemporary political evaluation of 
the failure of the EDC is among the most difficult analytical tasks faced 
by Europe’s scholars.
Barely a year after the French National Assembly had brought the EDC 
down, the historic decision was taken at a Foreign Ministers’ conference 
of ECSC countries in Messina to attempt a new approach to integration, 
this time in the economic sphere and in atomic energy, which was at the 
time still universally regarded as the energy of the future and therefore as 
constituting the next step in functional integration following coal and 
steel. Jean Monnet was initially rather reticent towards the comprehensive 
approach of the “Common Market”, the EEC. From the methodological 
viewpoint, EURATOM was more in line with his philosophy of functional 
integration.
The development took place in a different way. The comprehensive ap­
proach of the Economic Community was successful beyond all expecta­




























































































and with the merger of 2 March 1965 (in force from 1 July 1957) it was 
practically absorbed into the larger Community.
With hindsight, does this finding diminish the merits and importance of 
Jean Monnet? Certainly not. Without him the breakthrough of the concept 
of integration from a vague idea into reality would not have come about. 
And even the failure of the EDC had the positive aspect of provoking the 
shock that led to the success of Messina.
The breakthrough achieved by Monnet took place without the involve­
ment of Britain and, in the final measure, against his will. Britain would 
have preferred cooperation to remain on the inter-governmental level, as 
with die Council of Europe, the OEEC or the European Payments Union. 
The motives for this attitude, which still operate today, are worth 
analysing.
The terrible sufferings and sacrifices of the second European civil war 
unleashed by Germany had left all the peoples and countries affected by it 
in a state of extreme exhaustion. But their psychological starting-point in 
1945 was very different. It ranged from the shock of utter defeat, of di­
vision and of total loss of sovereignty in the case of Germany to the proud 
consciousness of being victorious and holding the position of third world 
power in the case of Britain. Germany could not sink deeper than it had, 
and any step that it took after zero hour could only be upwards. Britain 
lived in the illusion of a power position that it in fact no longer possessed, 
and faced a long road of painful adjustments. Every renunciation of 
sovereignty that the Federal Republic of Germany accepted in the course 
of European and Atlantic integration was in reality merely the price for 
regaining statehood and a capacity for action, and was therefore not a 
sacrifice, but, in the upshot, a gain. By contrast for Britain, which saw 
itself as the centre of a world political system of Atlantic partnership, the 
Commonwealth and the European continent, renunciation of sovereignty 
must have appeared as an act of national abdication. To be sure, there 
were also practical reasons why London rejected forms of integration 
going beyond inter-governmental cooperation: concern for Common­
wealth trading preferences, for the functioning of the sterling area and 
for the newly emergent global structures embodied in the United Nations, 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and GATT. But the 
fact that British reservations on the transfer of sovereign rights to Com­
munity institutions still exist today, even though these reasons have 
largely lost importance seems to show that the real cause lies deeper. It 
was Britain’s national self-image which from the outset led to its position 
of aloofness concerning integration and which in fact from time to time 
meant it deliberately or implicitly sought to undermine it.
One such attempt can be seen in the proposal to set up, simultaneously 
with the “Common Market”, a “great free-trade area”, which was to 
cover, on the one hand, the recently established EEC and, on the other, 




























































































Viewed from the outside, this project failed for technical reasons such 
as those of harmonization of external customs tariffs and of commercial 
policy, the question of origin, protective clauses, Commonwealth prefer­
ences and the inclusion of agriculture. In reality, however, the fundamen­
tal issues involved were the “philosophy” of European unification and the 
crucial question of leadership in Europe.
Regarding the “philosophy”, even within the Community there were 
two opposing schools of thought in Germany exemplified on the one hand 
by the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard, and on the 
other by the first President of the European Commission Walter Hallstein. 
The first group, the globalists, the spokesman for which was the Swiss 
economist of German origin, Wilhelm Ropke, were at bottom opposed to 
any regional structure and even more so to a narrow community of six. 
They feared the danger of a splitting of Europe into trade blocs, of a 
trade war, and of a highly protectionist community. The term “fortress 
Europe”, often heard today, had not yet been coined. But the fears al­
ready existed, even in their emotive exaggeration, which not infrequently 
spilled over into blind vehemence.
Today we know how exaggerated those fears were, but that obviously 
does not prevent them from being repeated.
The other group, with France at the head, and also the Commission, 
instead feared that the Community that had only just been founded would 
dissolve in the free-trade area like sugar in a teacup. That this was pre­
cisely Britain’s intention was a widespread if seldom openly expressed 
suspicion among the “Europeans”.
Were these concerns by the “Europeans” justified? It never came to the 
test, since the negotiations on the free-trade area failed on 14 November 
1958 with the French veto. On 1 June 1958 Charles de Gaulle had come 
to power in France. This signalled the return to the European political 
stage of a giant who was to bestride it for the next eleven years. His veto 
— not the last, as it turned out — was of great significance in more than 
one respect. The first remarkable point was that here all at once there was 
a government with the rare courage to say no. This courage was subse­
quently often used for purposes that set grave obstacles in the path of Eu­
ropean integration. That is not so clear, however, in the present case.
The question whether the EEC would have dissolved in the great free- 
trade area or have been stifled in it cannot, as we have said, be answered 
conclusively. That such a danger existed there can be no doubt. It was 
averted, but at the cost of a crisis. But crises pass. Fundamental interests 
prevailed: the Treaties of Rome were ratified and entered into force in 
line with the prevailing political will of those involved and, in the view of 
a majority, with their economic interests as well. America stood firmly 
behind the young Community, rejecting discrimination by an “unpolitical” 
free-trade area. So the troubled waters were calmed, and the Community 




























































































To be sure, the French veto of 1958 had other consequences as well, 
perhaps not foreseen so clearly at the time. The much feared trade war 
between the EEC and the “little free-trade area”, EFTA, founded after the 
failure of the negotiations, did not occur. Trade wars, at any rate between 
friends and trading partners, do not deserve the name anyway, since they 
are not, as a mie, concerned with destroying or damaging the opponent, 
but with balancing out mutual advantages. The EEC and EFTA, accord­
ingly, managed to get along together quite well.
Britain, however, saw itself excluded from having a say on the Conti­
nent, and inevitably felt this state of affairs to be unacceptable. Its whole 
historical experience opposed the idea that unification of the Continent 
should take place without any control from London. But since the failure 
of the free-trade area meant that the only recourse open was accession, it 
was logical and inevitable that the French veto would sooner or later in­
duce London to apply for membership in the Community.
Thus through the veto the road was paved towards a decision of prin­
ciple which, following two failed attemps in 1961 and 1967, was finally 
taken in December 1969, namely the decision that the Community was to 
follow the path of “enlargement”. This decision, at the same time, meant a 
slow-down and perhaps even a limitation of its “deepening”, since while 
one does not exclude the other, it does make it harder. However, the 
slow-down in the integration process was not primarily a consequence of 
accession by Britain, Denmark and Ireland to the Community, but the 
outcome of Charles de Gaulle’s policies.
As has been said, the psychological and political starting-point of the 
various European countries in 1945 was highly divergent. France was in a 
quite special position, differing fundamentally from the German one but 
also considerably from the British one. France had initially lost the Sec­
ond World War, only to end up sharing in winning it. This was thanks 
above all to the upbending will of one dominating personality, Charles de 
Gaulle, to whom the reins of government, indeed the reshaping of the Re­
public, were once again entrusted in 1958.
This is not the place to analyse the political convictions, the “ideology”, 
of this great man. Was he a “nationalist”? An 18th-century man? An au­
tocrat? Probably no such cliché can be assigned to him. But two things are 
beyond doubt, and must be perceived if de Gaulle and his policies are to 
be understood: the deep impression that the decline and collapse of the 
Third Republic had left on him, and his conviction that only national 
pride and national self-assurance could give France the strength to find its 
way back to greatness.
From this viewpoint, de Gaulle had to reject the idea of supra-nation- 
ality and of transferring sovereign rights to Community institutions. In 
this his position resembled that of the leading British politicians. By con­
trast with them, however, he saw France’s opportunity as lying within 
Europe. His aim was not to keep the development of Europe under con­




























































































sovereignty, to have it administered by autonomous Community institu­
tions. The “Europe des patries”, an expression not coined by de Gaulle 
but by Michel Debré, was to be a Community and yet not one, a loose 
federation of states and yet more than the sum of its parts, able to defend 
a European identity against American predominance and yet leave the 
identity of the nation States unaffected. The contradictions inherent in 
such a concept could have been resolved only in a hegemonic structure, 
but France was not strong enough to achieve this, as de Gaulle was no 
doubt well aware. He therefore saw no choice but to pursue a policy re­
garding Europe that in the end was bound to prove ineffective.
Initially, however, de Gaulle took two actions that were to be equally 
favourable to integration. He stopped the tug of war over the great free- 
trade area, thus liberating the Community’s powers of self-realization; he 
reformed France economically and politically, freed it of the heavy bur­
dens of the decolonization process and thereby for the first time put it in a 
position to take up its role in the Community without restrictions. His 
policy could be called dialectical. It was his policy that made the Com­
munity fully functional, but it was this very policy that also led to severe 
setbacks for the Community.
The fact that the General rejected the supra-national structure of the 
Community was well-known long before he came to power. Accordingly, 
the new regime was not welcomed by the “Europeans” without concern. 
How much the greater, then, was their relief when de Gaulle, meeting 
with the German Federal Chancellor on 26 November 1958 in Bad 
Kreuznach, stated his willingness to maintain and advance cooperation 
within the framework of the European Community.
However, this relief was to prove premature. In fact, the General’s ac­
ceptance of the Treaties, since they had after all been signed and ratified, 
in no way meant a retreat from rejection of supra-nationality or from his 
conviction that political decisions should, in the area of economic integra­
tion too, be reserved for the States alone. De Gaulle made this clear in his 
press conference of 5 November 1960 where he set forth the plan for a 
“political union” which subsequently became known as the Fouchet Plan. 
He was thereby clearly and deliberately opposing — and this is an impor­
tant point to which we shall return — all those European federalists who, 
like Monnet, Hallstein and probably Spaak too, believed that political in­
tegration would by necessity result from the objective compulsions inher­
ent in the process of economic integration. The impression gained by the 
observer in hindsight is not that the General with his initiative was simply 
pursuing the goal of supplementing economic integration with political 
unification. Instead, what one suspects is that he wanted to switch the po­
litical points in his direction, before the unexpectedly dynamic institu­
tionalized cooperation in the EEC started to spark over from the eco­
nomic sphere into politics.
The method used by de Gaulle to guide developments in the directions 




























































































level political structure. The Council of Heads of State and Government, 
which was in de Gaulle’s view to be responsible for fundamental questions 
of the economy too and which was, of course, to function according to 
principles of inter-governmental cooperation, that is, according to the 
unanimity principle and without being bound by proposals from an inde­
pendent Community agency, was to be above the institutions of the Rome 
Treaties. But this would have meant moving the Community system off its 
pivot.
The course of events is well-known, and need not be gone into in detail 
here. Following laborious negotiations, a far-reaching rapprochement was 
achieved in late 1961. A struggle within the Community ensued at the end 
of the year over entering the second stage of the transitional period, in 
which the main question at stake was the formulation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Following a marathon lasting almost three weeks, 
which can only be recalled with horror by all those who were present, the 
package was tied up on 14 January 1962 and the decision was taken for 
the Community to enter the second stage of the transitional period. Then, 
on 17 January 1962, President de Gaulle unexpectedly presented his part­
ners with a new version of the Fouchet Plan which practically withdrew 
all the concessions that had been wrung from France by the Five during 
more than a year of tough negotiations.
For the second time, the General had put his veto down. The shock was 
enormous, strengthened by the suspicion of many that they had been de­
ceived. Was this the pay-off for the concessions that had been made, by no 
means least to France, in the agricultural negotiations? In fact the coup of 
17 January 1962 marked the end of the Fouchet Plan. There were still at­
tempts to save or revive it, which, however, failed due to Belgian and 
Dutch resistance.
But this chapter, as it turned out, was not really finished. The French 
“empty chair” policy in the Community from 30 June 1965 onwards, 
ending only with the Luxembourg dissent of 28 January 1966, with its 
distorting effects, has to be seen together with the failure of the Fouchet 
Plan within a single political context which has not as yet been adequately 
studied.
The failure of the Fouchet Plan was firstly due to the incompatibility of 
the General’s objectives on the one hand with his partners’ on the other, 
but probably equally to the fact that the French President mis-estimated 
the interests of his partners.
This was true primarily for the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
was then faced with the hardest of dilemmas. For its first Chancellor, as 
for all his successors, the indispensability of close Franco-German part­
nership and cooperation was an axiom of German foreign policy after the 
Second World War.
This is partly for historical reasons. The replacement of the “hereditary 
enmity” between the two countries and peoples by a relationship of 




























































































results of their post-war policy. But the undeniable support by all Federal 
governments for the close links is motivated by other factors as well, very 
much ones of “Realpolitik”. The Federal Republic of Germany and 
France see themselves as the core of the European Community, since 
without their collaboration no advance is conceivable, while this collabo­
ration itself has often been the catalyst for advancement. Additionally, 
however, the Federal Republic and France are politically and from a se­
curity viewpoint the core of what is left of Europe after two world wars 
and the loss of the great power status of the European states. Without the 
closest cohesion between these two nations there cannot be any significant 
counterweight on the old continent to the world power of Soviet Russia. 
This aspect will remain decisive as long as the question of balance contin­
ues to play a role in policy. It will therefore presumably retain its impor­
tance even in the event of successful reform of the Soviet system of gov­
ernment and of society.
But the combined forces of Germany and France alone cannot create 
balance in Europe. The weight of Russia is too great for that. It was this 
in particular that led to Adenauer’s dilemma, that barred him from fol­
lowing de Gaulle’s line, and also made it unacceptable from a domestic 
policy viewpoint. For de Gaulle’s policy was unmistakably directed 
against the predominant position of America in the Western Alliance, 
which Bonn as the much more heavily exposed and more dependent part­
ner had not only to accept but indeed to support. The General’s policy on 
the Alliance was thus in contradiction with vital interests of the Federal 
Republic. For a time it actually split public opinion, expressed, for in­
stance, in the struggle in Germany between “Atlanticists” and “Gaullists”, 
or in the preamble added to the Act ratifying the Franco-German Treaty 
of 22 January 1965 by a large majority of the German Bundestag, and 
which in de Gaulle’s eyes largely deprived it of value.
If, then, the German “Atlanticists” could not follow de Gaulle, the 
“Europeans”, particularly the “federalists” among them, were equally 
unable to do so, for their own reasons. The result was a common front 
against the General’s policies among groupings that otherwise by no 
means agreed with each other. Many “Atlanticists” were at the same time 
“globalists”, who would basically have preferred a great free-trade area 
to the EEC.
The General probably also wrongly estimated the response and weight 
of the Benelux countries. Here, from his nation-State viewpoint and way 
of thinking, he had a particular admiration for the Netherlands. For him 
they represented, and not wrongly, the only old nation State, apart from 
France, with rich traditions in the Community of Six.
The Benelux countries, a core country of Western Europe since 
Lothar’s Kingdom and the great century of Burgundy, have played a 
special role in the integration process since the Second World War. This 
often went far beyond their relative weight in quantitative terms, and has 




























































































statesmanly gifts of such personalities as Paul Henry Spaak and Joseph 
Bech, particularly of their European convictions, which often seems 
easier for Belgium and Luxembourg to embody than for Holland as a 
former great power. Historical experience and wise self-awareness had 
taught these countries to approach their bigger neighbours with caution. 
Thus, in the integration process too they sought guarantees against their 
excessive weight. They found these in the Community, particularly in its 
independent institutions, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the 
Parliamentary Assembly. They could not follow de Gaulle’s line, if only 
because his policy sought to restrict these institutions to a technical role. 
But Holland in particular would have been prepared to do without the 
corrective of supra-nationality and agree to the inter-governmental 
cooperation that de Gaulle wanted if only Britain had been included as a 
counterweight to the Federal Republic and France. But this again proved 
to be innacceptable to the General.
The Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, and still more his Dutch colleague 
Luns, have been reproached for having blocked political unification 
through their uncompromising attitudes in the last phase of negotiations 
on de Gaulle’s initiative. It has even been argued from the French side 
that the 1965-6 crisis would not have occurred if the Six had been able to 
agree in 1962.
The last point will still have to be dealt with. But the reproach against 
the Dutch for having taken up an intransigent attitude does not seem jus­
tified. What is true is that the Dutch call for the immediate involvement 
of Britain in political cooperation was plainly unacceptable to de Gaulle. 
It was also largely criticized by the “Europeans” . But the fact that Britain 
had in the meantime applied for accession to the Community made it at 
least not illogical.
Primarily, however, it was a question of trust in de Gaulle’s intentions. 
This had been undermined by his repeated heavy criticisms of the Com­
munity institutions and Community procedures and by his volte-face of 17 
January 1962. Ultimately, the Fouchet Plan failed neither because of the 
stiff Dutch neck nor because of British interference. It failed because of 
the incompatibility of convictions and objectives. To be sure, Monnet and 
many of his friends and supporters were right to warn against over-rigid 
attitudes towards de Gaulle’s proposals. Undoubtedly, too, the inflexible 
Dutch attitude had contributed to a deterioration in atmosphere. But the 
contradiction was not to be bridged by compromise formulae. This was 
proved by the 1965-6 crisis, which could have been avoided only if the 
French President had in 1962 already attained his goal of transforming 
the Community system, stripping it of its supra-national element.
Anyone involved in the process of European integration in those years 
will recall that de Gaulle’s supporters used to fend off discussion on 
strengthening the Community institutions with the argument that these 
were “theological” disputes. This was meant to play down such discussions 




























































































choice of the term “theological” unwittingly betrayed the fact that people 
were very well aware of the high ranking nature of these problems. It is 
quite true that the Spaak committee had proceeded very cautiously in the 
negotiations on the Treaties of Rome with respect to institutional 
questions and had taken them up only at the last moment. But the reason 
for this was not that institutional questions were regarded as minor. On 
the contrary, people were only too well aware of their decisive impor­
tance, but also of their particular sensitivity, since the failure of the EDC. 
No one saw this more clearly than the General, who by no means coinci­
dentally set the reform of France’s institutions at the very centre of his 
major effort for renewal. At European level too, he could have no doubts 
as to the importance of institutions. His resistance to the European Com­
mission under its outstanding President, Walter Hallstein, was based not 
on its lack of efficiency but, on the contrary, on the fact that it was 
constantly gaining in authority, and was occasionally inclined to lay claim 
to too much.
Accordingly, the General’s political initiative failed on the one hand 
because of incompatible positions on fundamental questions of integration, 
but on the other because the great French statesman underestimated the 
divergent national interests of the Community partners and did not take 
them sufficiently into account.
There is a paradox here. For the very reason that de Gaulle attached so 
much importance to the individuality of nation States, he ought to have 
realized that only in a patient process of rapprochement, promoted by an 
effective institutional structure, could the degree of harmony be 
developed that would have put France in a position to effectively assume a 
leadership role. But de Gaulle on the one hand dismissed the integrative 
function of the institutions and on the other did not take enough account 
of the sovereign will and national interests of his partners. In Alliance 
policy he made excessive demands on the Federal German Chancellor, 
and in integration policy he did the same regarding the traditional 
interests of the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, of Belgium.
Accordingly, not only was failure assured, but a unique opportunity, 
never to return, was lost. It has been said that de Gaulle could have 
become the first president of Europe, but preferred to be the last 
monarch of France. That may be an exaggeration, but there is certainly a 
core of truth in it. There is an irony in the fact that the country that has 
contributed more to Europe’s unification than any other — in terms of 
the exercise of political and moral leadership — also contributed much 
towards damaging its own work. Perhaps that is the dialectic of history.
De Gaulle’s first veto, as has been illustrated, brought down the great 
free-trade area and thus, probably unintentionally, brought the 
Community onto the path of enlargement — at the expense of deepening. 
This became clear when the peripheral counter-integration in the EFTA 




























































































Kingdom, followed by Ireland, Denmark and Norway, applied for 
membership in August 1961.
The reasons why the British attitude to continental European integration 
had to be ambivalent have already been sketched out above. As with de 
Gaulle’s Europe policy, British European policy has often been accused of 
hypocrisy, indeed of dishonesty. In fact, it is much more likely in both 
cases that short-term national interests ran counter to long-term European 
ones, the result being an intrinsically contradictory policy that was neither 
straightforward nor could appear to be so. It is more that likely that the 
project for the great free-trade area was intended not only to build a 
bridge between the Six and the other members of the OEEC, but also to 
keep development of the Community under British control. It is also clear 
that the political initiative of the Fouchet Plan met with British mistrust. 
Finally, there is no doubt that the 1961 entry application was above all 
politically motivated and certainly bound up with the objective of keeping 
continental European federalism within limits. Here the British attitude 
coincided with de Gaulle’s, from which the initial conclusion may perhaps 
have been drawn in London that the General would not necessarily oppose 
Britain’s accession to the Community.
In fact, however, the political conceptions of the two powers were, 
despite a shared rejection of federalism, incompatible. De Gaulle’s 
conception was essentially a European one. He was concerned with the 
identity of the Old Continent among the great powers. But Britain saw 
itself as a link between the Continent, to which it did not itself basically 
belong, and the leading Atlantic power. The incompatibility of its position 
with the General’s thus resulted, as was the case for the Federal Republic, 
though for different reasons, mainly from differing attitudes towards 
America and its role in the Atlantic Alliance. Specifically on this question, 
as well as on relations to Soviet Russia, finding and effectively putting 
forward a common position is a central concern of European integration, 
and it is a question which is still continually threatened with defeat. To 
this day, it is the one issue on which the differing political and psy­
chological starting positions of the three main European powers involved 
most clearly emerge.
For France and the Federal Republic of Germany the problem ulti­
mately lies in dependence on America. De Gaulle tolerated severe Atlantic 
crises, but also internal European ones in order to reduce that dependency 
to a psychologically tolerable level. He did achieve this for France, 
though at the high price of causing irreparable damage to the military or­
ganization of the Alliance. Thanks to General’s policy France’s relation­
ship to the US became ultimately relaxed. Though the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the contrary had regained its sovereignty in the course of the 
cold war, it remains nevertheless located at the interface between the two 
alliances, and while purely conventionally armed it remains defenseless on 
its own; thus, no such option has ever been available. Its relationship to 





























































































Britain is in quite a different position. It emerged from the Second 
World War as apparently the third world power and above all the most 
important and closest ally of the United States. In a political and psycho­
logical sense it has remained so up to the present. TTie frequently denied 
“special relationship” is still a reality, and is especially seen from London 
as a political asset of the greatest value, the cultivation of which is given 
constant attention. While the US is indisputably the primus in this 
relationship, it is nevertheless inter pares, more like the son that has out­
grown the father than like the elder brother. This relationship completely 
lacks the tension that drove de Gaulle to rebel and exposes Germany to 
perceptible psychological and political burdens.
For Britain, one might say, the cultivation of the “special relationship” 
is a means of maintaining its own importance in the world. De Gaulle in 
his turn saw renewed greatness for France in leading a “European Eu­
rope”, a Europe free of American hegemony. It was no coincidence that it 
was he, in his press conference of 31 May 1960, who conceived the 
remarkably unrealistic concept of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
a concept which Gorbachev was to recast into the fascinating vision of the 
“common European home”. But from the viewpoint of cultural history 
this could only be a home reaching from San Francisco to the eastern 
frontier of Poland and accommodating the nations with a Western tradi­
tion, whereas from the point of view of a balance of power, only an area 
from San Francisco to Vladivostok would make sense. It is only in the 
limited field of conventional arms control that the limitation from the 
Atlantic to the Urals is meaningful. Amazingly, however, this does not 
seem to prevent this simultaneously unrealistic and dangerous formula 
being used.
As one can see, the positions of Britain and of France were diametri­
cally opposed on central political questions. The common rejection of 
federalism, which Monnet wished to take advantage of so as to “make the 
best of it”, in order to encourage British accession to the Community, did 
not alter the fact that Britain’s membership was incompatible with 
Gaullist France’s claim to leadership. It is therefore hardly surprising that 
after tough, difficult negotiations for more than a year, there came a third 
veto from the General, at a press conference on 14 January 1963. This 
put an end for nearly ten years to the expectations of all those who hoped 
for British participation or regarded it as indispensable.
Much has been said, written and puzzled over on the question of 
whether this was unavoidable. One question in particular that has contin­
ually been asked is whether the British side had not overplayed its hand 
and missed the right moment in autumn 1962 to make the necessary 
compromises, especially in the area of agriculture. History cannot be 
asked about possible alternatives, but the contemporary witness who saw 
events from close up receives another impression. It may certainly be 
argued that the British side exaggerated its tactics withholding conces­




























































































order to build up time pressure at the same time. But there is little to sug­
gest that the General stopped the negotiations because they appeared to 
him to have no prospects. Things seemed if anything to be the other way 
round. The British-American Nassau agreement of 21 December 1962 on 
equipping the British nuclear strike force with American Polaris rockets 
must have confirmed the General in his fear that Britain might become 
the “Trojan horse” for the Americans in his Europe, and so he forced 
accession negotiations to be broken off irrespective of the position they 
had reached, and, in fact, perhaps precisely because they finally seemed to 
be on the right road.
It says much for the resilience of the European integration movement 
that it has been able to survive even shocks of this magnitude and remain 
apparently unaffected. After a relatively short phase of turbulence the 
Community again turned to its internal structure. In the remaining years 
of the second stage of the transitional period provided for in the Treaty of 
Rome, that is, until 1 January 1966, it even made important advances, 
culminating in agreement on the merger of the executives, i.e. the EEC 
and EURATOM Commissions and the High Authority of the ECSC, on 2 
March 1965.
Nevertheless, the years from the failure of the first British negotiations 
in early 1963 to the third successful approach to entry in June 1970 
appear in hindsight as a tragic phase for Europe.
Sub specie aeternitatis, enlargement of the Community was unavoidable. 
There could no longer be any doubt about this, following the shift in 
British policy after 1961. It had also become necessary, since integration 
could not be continued in the long-term against Britain, and London was 
no longer prepared to simply stand aside. However, France’s partners 
were, despite the shock of 14 January 1963, prepared to continue going 
forward in the direction pointed to by the Treaties, and, as the merger of 
the institutions showed, even further than that. With entry into the first 
stage on 1 January 1966, in which majority decision in the Council of 
Ministers was to become the rule, the Community would have achieved 
the breakthrough into supra-nationality. Whether it could have managed 
this if at that time it had already been enlarged to include Britain, 
Denmark, Norway and Ireland can only be an object of speculation, but 
may well be doubted. The political and psychological setback brought 
about by the postponement of “enlargement” for almost a decade never­
theless provided an opportunity to use this time fully for “deepening”.
But this opportunity was lost through de Gaulle’s fourth veto. No single 
political act has so lastingly harmed European integration as that veto of 
30 June 1965. What had not been achieved with the 1960 initiative, 
rendering the Community’s supra-national system de facto powerless, was 
now achieved.
What had happened? The Member States had undertaken to decide on 
the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy by 30 June 1965. The 




























































































existing pro rata contributions of Member States, provided for the Com­
munity to have its own resources, to be administered by the Commission 
under control by the European Parliament. This really rather supra-na­
tional proposal was expounded by the Commission to Parliament before it 
was officially brought before the Council.
Such a procedure was just as unacceptable to de Gaulle as was the con­
tent of the proposals themselves. This inevitably put additional burdens on 
the discussions in the Council, which were already difficult enough. De­
spite long night sessions, no agreement could be reached by the end of the 
30th of June. But instead of “stopping the clock”, as is customary in such 
cases, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, in the Chair, pro­
nounced the failure of the negotiations. Since its partners had not met 
their undertakings, France would henceforth not take part in the work of 
the Council and would also withdraw its permanent representatives from 
Brussels.
Once again the moderate stance of France’s partners brought the Com­
munity through even this crisis. They did not succumb to the temptation 
to respond to de Gaulle’s policy of the “empty chair” by taking steps 
without France that might possibly have meant a break. When the nega­
tive effect of the crisis on public opinion in France, particularly among 
the farmers, resulted in de Gaulle’s failure to secure an absolute majority 
in the first round of elections for the French presidency on 5 December 
1965, the time was ripe to resolve the crisis.
This came about at the Council meeting in Luxembourg on 28 and 29 
January 1966 in the form of the so-called “Luxembourg compromise”, 
which in reality was a dissent. France returned to the Council table; but it 
insisted that in questions of important national interest further negotia­
tions had to continue in the Council at the request of the country con­
cerned, until consensus, that is unanimity, had been reached. While the 
other five maintained their standpoint that the Treaty ought to be applied, 
they nevertheless voted for resumption of normal Council work without 
preconditions. This, in practice, meant suspending the majority principle, 
preventing the Community from entering the phase of supra-nationality 
on 1 January 1966.
To that extent, it may justifiably be said that the test of whether political 
integration would inevitably result from economic integration was never 
carried out.
Twenty years were to pass before the Luxembourg setback could be 
overcome procedurally, with the réintroduction of the majority principle 
by the Single European Act. However, it is quite another question 
whether the damage done could be remedied. For the damage was enor­
mous. The decision-making process in the Community was made ex­
traordinarily difficult and slow. The quality of decisions, which often had 
to be brought to the lowest common denominator, tended to fall. Often 
the Community was paralysed, and for years unable to take objectively 




























































































opinion in Member States disappeared, making the integration process 
lose much of its political dynamics.
It is barely possible to remedy this damage. Historical opportunities do 
not return, and lost time cannot be made up. Whether the new start the 
Community is embarking on with the Single European Act and the project 
for the single market in 1992 will turn out to be a real political quantum 
leap still remains to be seen.
Legends have burgeoned around this crisis too, particularly about 
alleged political failures by the Commission under its President, Walter 
Hallstein. The Commission, it is said, had gone too far in its proposals for 
financing the Common Agricultural Policy: it had affronted de Gaulle by 
making them known too early in the European Parliament; it had, in the 
decisive negotiations on completion of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
failed to bring compromise proposals able to secure consensus onto the 
table in good time before the time limit expired on 30 June 1965; it had 
aroused the General’s wrath by comporting itself like a government, for 
instance, in accepting credentials.
Indeed Walter Hallstein did, and in this he was quite different from Jean 
Monnet, play the Commission’s protocol act high, perhaps too high. In 
fact he, like Monnet, extracted the maximum political effect from the 
position of the executive and its president, and with great success. But by 
contrast with Monnet’s presidency of the ECSC, Hallstein’s in the EEC 
was in the de Gaulle era, and that alone makes the decisive difference. At 
stake, as the General had for years made clear beyond doubt, were the 
fundamental principles of the unification process, contradictions that were 
unbridgeable and that had to come to a head at the last moment, at five-to- 
twelve as it were at the threshold of supra-nationality, i.e. before 1 
January 1966. Nothing could have prevented de Gaulle from bringing 
about the crisis before expiry of that fateful time limit. The inflexible 
resolution he demonstrated on 14 November 1958, on 17 January 1962 
and on 14 January 1963 allows no doubt about that. The unique force of 
his personality rendered undying service to his country, but at a high 
price in terms of European integration.
The European federalists, not least the eminently creative and prag­
matic Monnet, and Hallstein, unequalled in exploiting institutional possi­
bilities, had assumed that in integration the “cunning of history” would 
prove itself. Their calculations lay, as already said, in the assumption or 
at any rate the hope that political integration would come about via facti, 
through the pressure of the facts of economic integration. It is a common­
place today that this calculation was wrong; in other words, that the 
founding fathers of Europe were lacking in political realism. But this 
theorem is unprovable, since it was never put to the test.
Walter Hallstein, in the forefront in this connection since he bore 
operational responsibility in a central position during the crisis years, 
may have overestimated the Commission’s possibilities. Perhaps that was 




























































































blamed for believing that the Member States would actually implement 
the Treaty of Rome. The core of its system is the subtly balanced and 
precisely circumscribed principle of decision by qualified majority on the 
basis of proposals from an independent Commission, which may be 
departed from only unanimously. This system was neither suitable nor 
intended for simply steam-rolling the national interests of Member States. 
The founding fathers of the Treaty never surrendered to the naive belief 
that genuinely vital interests of a Member State could be out-voted 
through majority decision. Yet, as Jean Monnet himself pointed out, the 
mere possibility of a majority vote would increase the willingness of 
national governments to compromise, make it easier for them to keep face 
at home and thus decisively promote the decision-making capacity of the 
Community’s legislative organ, the Council.
No one, not even the founding fathers, could foresee that this system 
would be knocked out of kilter by a single act of power by a uniquely 
strong personality.
On 28 April 1969 Charles de Gaulle resigned from the presidency, 
after his defeat in a referendum on a constitutional question. It was the 
end of an era.
The General is the most fascinating European statesman of his time, and 
certainly one of the most important. He left his country transformed, 
freed from the yoke of colonial wars, equipped with functioning 
institutions, economically strengthened, internationally respected, holding 
a leading position in Europe and full of new self-confidence.
At the same time, however, he had succeeded neither in shaping Europe 
in accordance with his ideas nor in playing a politically determining role 
between the great powers or in concert with them. France’s resources 
were not sufficient for that. De Gaulle, if anyone, would have been ca­
pable of bringing Europe together, but his intrinsically contradictory 
policy prevented him from doing so.
His successor, Georges Pompidou, himself a “Gaullist” and for years a 
close confidant of the General, administered and augmented the 
patrimony of his great predecessor loyally in spirit and effectively in 
deed. At the same time, however, within this framework he adapted 
France’s policy to the needs of the time. Above all in European policy, he 
made changes more quickly and more radically than one would have been 
led to expect by the long shadow that his great predecessor continued to 
cast over France for years.
This adaptation of French European policy first became visible at the 
Hague summit conference on 1 and 2 December 1969. The conference 
had been convened on French initiative. At the same time it was strongly 
supported and shaped in content by the new German Federal Chancellor 
Willy Brandt, who attached much importance to advancing European in­
tegration. In this he was in line with a basic foreign policy principle of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Brandt was about to embark on the 




























































































was for him, as for his successors, the ever stronger tying of his country 
into the family of free nations. In Europe, the Community is its keystone.
The Hague Summit Conference was the first for almost nine years, 
apart from the mainly ceremonial summit meeting in Rome on 29 and 30 
March 1967 on the 10th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties. This 
fact provides a measure of the depth of the crisis in which the Community 
had been left as a result of the failure of the first attempt at political 
union.
The outcome of The Hague, the “triptych” of “enlargement, completion 
and deepening”, in fact brought the Community new impetus, albeit not to 
the hoped-for extent. Of the three most important resolutions agreed on 
by the conference, not least at German insistence, those on enlargement 
and the setting up of “European political cooperation”, led to success; the 
third, on formation of an economic and monetary union, was, instead, to 
show only limited results.
The resolution on enlargement led on 30 June 1970 to the resumption 
of entry talks with Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, and on 22 
January 1972 to the signature of the accession treaties by these countries 
with the exception of Norway. The shift in the French position on this is­
sue, already adumbrated under de Gaulle, must also be seen in connection 
with considerations of equilibrium. The point was to give the Community 
a better balance, having regard to the steadily growing economic weight 
of the Federal Republic.
The resolution on political cooperation was converted on 27 October 
1970 into a report, the so-called Luxembourg Report, presented by the 
Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and government and adopted by 
them. On the basis of the resolutions of the Paris summit of 21 October 
1972 and the second report by the Foreign Ministers of 23 July 1973, the 
so-called Copenhagen Report, the EPC was then further extended. Since 
signature of the accession treaties in January 1972, Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland had been fully involved in it.
The Political Cooperation deserves closer consideration, from several 
viewpoints. When the Foreign Ministers met for their inaugural meeting 
on 19 November 1970, it was their first “political” meeting since they had 
met in connection with de Gaulle’s political initiatives. In the interim their 
multi-lateral meetings had been confined to the sessions of the Council of 
the Community.
This is a remarkable circumstance, scarcely imaginable today. Six 
neighbouring European countries, linked with each other through treaties 
on economic integration, politically committed to the idea of the unifica­
tion of Europe, were for ten years incapable of joint foreign policy dis­
cussion. Yet the Community is no freer of political and psychological 
“blocks” of a similar nature today than it was then. And recognition or 
acknowledgement of these “blocks” by those responsible for them is just 




























































































Even when it had come out of the cradle, the EPC was long unable to 
get off the ground without constraints. France insisted on a strict separa­
tion of the Political Cooperation from the Community. The hope no doubt 
entertained by de Gaulle, that the inter-governmental system of the 
Fouchet Plan would overlay the Community structure, had evidently 
given way to the inverse concern that a link between EPC and Community 
would give the latter a more political content and might thus lead to a 
“Communitization” of foreign policy. On 23 July 1973 the separation 
took the grotesque form of having the foreign ministers meeting in the 
morning in Copenhagen under the EPC, only to meet again the same 
afternoon in Brussels in the Council. Accordingly, it took years, until the 
Paris summit in December 1974, before account could be taken of the fact 
that the Community’s external relationships cannot be separated from the 
EPC.
Again not without an occasional controversy, but on the whole fairly 
free of friction, was the gradual inclusion of the Commission in the EPC, 
initially confined strictly to questions “directly” affecting the Commu­
nity’s competences and gradually being extended to all types of work.
Weightier than these transient problems was the fundamental decision 
of the governments to place foreign-policy cooperation on an inter-gov- 
emmental basis. This decision still stands although the Single European 
Act has made the EPC an integral part of the integration treaty.
This decision was certainly unavoidable. As is the case with defence, 
currency and fiscal sovereignty, foreign policy too is a keystone of 
national sovereignty. This is true not least because it affects vital national 
interests. How much of this is reality and how much mere perception need 
not be gone into, since perceptions, as Kissinger said, weigh no less 
heavily in politics than do realities. In 1970 the time was not yet ripe for 
supra-nationality in foreign policy, that is, for majority decisions or joint 
representation. That was clear to all those involved from the outset, and 
not much has changed in the meantime in this regard. It is, though, 
necessary to realize what this means.
By contrast with Community commercial policy, then, there is no 
majority decision and therefore no perceptible pressure towards unity. 
Above all, however, there is no joint representation externally, apart 
from the presidency rotating every six months, most recently occasionally 
augmented by the so-called Troika system. But a presidential power can 
always only represent the Community interest imperfectly. The Foreign 
Ministers always remain first and foremost representatives of their own 
countries. Additionally, by contrast with what happens with commercial 
policy, no one is compelled to negotiate with the EPC as such. It is a 
sounding-board and at most a mouthpiece, but not really an actor on the 
international stage.
This has considerably limited its effectiveness. For all its merits, it has 
never, unlike the Community commercial policy, become anything more 




























































































able to be successful only where the question of power plays no or almost 
no part, namely in international bodies operating on the principle of 
equality of states, that is, on a legal basis. This is true of the United 
Nations General Assembly and to a particular degree of the Helsinki pro­
cess. Here the Nine, the Ten, and most recently the Twelve have often 
been able to play a decisive part; but these are after all decision-making 
processes which, while subject — in the case of the Helsinki process — to 
the principle of consensus, come closer to parliamentary forms.
As against this, the EPC’s effect is minor where essentially only 
bilateral action can be taken, such as in regional crises. Here the EPC, 
unlike the Community when it comes to commercial policy, lacks a 
personality of its own. Correspondingly, it continually proves to be an 
illusion if individual Member States believe that their national diplomacy 
gains weight simply because it presents itself as the vehicle of a common 
goal. This state of affairs cannot be significantly changed by cosmetic re­
touches like the Troika system and the setting up of a ramp secretariat in 
Brussels.
As mentioned, the summits in The Hague in 1969 and in Paris in 1972 
were the first substantial meetings at this level for more than ten years. It 
had, however, become clear in the meantime that the Community’s in­
creasing weakness in decision-making could not be overcome without in­
stitutionalizing an organ at the highest level.
This weakness in decision-making had two main roots. Firstly, the 
unanimity principle perpetuated through the “Luxembourg dissent” acted 
in this direction. Secondly, this tendency was strengthened with 
enlargement, especially since Britain and Denmark saw non-application of 
the Treaty provisions on majority decisions as part of the basis for their 
accession. Against many irrational expectations, enlargement of the 
Community gave integration no new impulses, but rendered the painful 
progress even more difficult. Correspondingly, it was not possible to 
loosen up the principle of unanimity again either. Admittedly, France’s 
new President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who succeeded Georges Pompi­
dou on 27 May 1974, had reached the conviction that this loosening was 
necessary, but the communiqué of the summit conference he convoked in 
Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974 shows that in practice things remained 
at the Luxembourg dissent, where each Member State decided freely and 
without need to give justification for itself if it regarded a question as 
important enough to make use of the liberum veto, i.e., not to let it even 
come to a vote.
It was all the more important that the heads of State and government 
were able at that meeting to agree to meet regularly in future, 
specifically, as the communiqué says, as the “Council” of the Community. 
This meant that an important obstacle had been surpassed. The expanded 
Community had the supreme guiding body that it needed more than ever 




























































































lished, and here the Paris resolution differed from the Fouchet Plan, in 
that the new body was not to upset the institutional system of the Treaties.
It is true that the relative weight of national governments and institu­
tions in the Community has shifted over the years. This shift was until 
recently unilaterally in favour of the governments and Council and 
against the Commission. Whether the Single Act can alter this trend 
cannot yet be seen. But it was not the institutionalization of the European 
Council that gave the impetus for the shift, but rather the Luxembourg 
dissent.
Institutionalization of the European Council at the Paris summit at the 
same time meant the ending of the artificial separation of the European 
Political Cooperation from the Community. The EPC, however, remained 
inter-governmental and outside the Treaty. It was only 13 years later that, 
with the entry into force of the Single Act, foreign policy cooperation 
was to be established on a treaty basis, though admittedly without losing 
its inter-governmental character.
In the meantime, however, the Community had become involved in the 
deepest crisis of its history so far. It could rightly be termed an existential 
crisis.
On the basis of The Hague summit resolution, the Council had on 6 
March 1970 set up an ad hoc committee chaired by Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Pierre Wemer, to consider possibilities and ways of establishing 
an economic and monetary union. This was based on the growing 
perception that neither free trade in the Community nor the Common 
Agricultural Policy would be guaranteed as long as there were no fixed 
exchange rates, which in turn would require a great degree of common 
aspects of economic and monetary policy. Future events were to 
emphatically confirm this, in reality, obvious fact.
The Wemer Plan was put before the Council in October that year. It 
provided for the establishment of the economic and monetary union in 
three stages within ten years. It called among other things for removal of 
exchange-rate bands, irrevocable establishment of fixed exchange rates 
and the complete liberalization of capital movements. Parallel with this, 
convergence and ultimately unification of economic policies was to be 
brought about. The organs provided for were in the final stage an eco­
nomic decision-making body and a central banking system, as well as a 
directly elected parliament to which the decision-making body would be 
responsible.
After tough negotiations, in particular because France insisted on 
unanimous decisions even in the final stage, a heavily modified plan was 
adopted on 22 March 1971.
But things turned out very differently. Adoption of the plan coincided 
with the end of a long period of world economic prosperity under the 
arrangement of fixed exchange rates, the Bretton Woods system. Two 
severe economic crises following its adaptation in the years 1971-1974 




























































































important it would have been for the Community to have endowed itself 
in good time with the order and the institutions of an economic and 
monetary union.
The first crisis started from the US and led to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. The second was rooted in the oil price shock and 
the 1973 Middle East crisis.
With the flight from the dollar that started in 1971 and was repeated 
still more strongly in 1973, and the quadruplication of the price of oil, 
Community Member States were faced with severe balance-of-payments 
problems and heavy inflationary pressure. But this pressure did not lead 
to any convergence of response: it did not induce the Community 
countries to take joint action, but drove them apart.
Presumably two factors were decisive for this. Firstly, basic differences 
in the “philosophy” of economic policy came to light. Thus, German Eco­
nomic and Finance Minister Schiller advocated joint floating against the 
dollar, in essence a market economy measure, while his French colleague 
Giscard d’Estaing called for controls on capital movements, that is, 
government intervention.
The differences in thinking underlying these divergent responses were 
not unknown. But as long as the fair weather held it had been possible to 
live with them. In the crisis they had a disintegrating effect. Integration is 
not only, and perhaps not even primarily, a mechanical procedure based 
on rules and institutions. Both are indispensable, but integration also has 
to come about in consciousness, in minds. This requires first of all a 
readiness for compromise, and therefore a certain breadth of vision and 
magnanimity of thought. But these are not enough by themselves. It is 
also necessary to develop common habits of thought; that is, a 
consciousness-forming process that develops with time is needed, a 
process which probably cannot be significantly hastened.
Secondly, the Community institutions proved too weak to block the 
centrifugal forces in economic policy, a sort of “sauve qui peut” set in. 
What the institutions did just manage to do, and this deserves every 
respect, was largely to retain the “acquis communautaire”, to ensure that 
the Community did not simply fall apart. But under these circumstances 
there could be no prospect of genuine progress in building up economic 
and monetary union.
While the crises of the Community provoked by the great Charles de 
Gaulle were at bottom artificial ones, crises that objectively need not have 
occurred, resulting more from obstinacy than necessity, here it was hard 
political and economic realities that were at stake. Accordingly, the 
resilience that the Community once again displayed deserves even more 
respect than that shown in 1963 and 1965. The resilience was, and this 
should be said here, not least the merit of the German member, which 
although relatively best able to cope with the crisis, did not nevertheless 




























































































The crisis of the 70s provides the occasion for considerations on the 
internal equilibrium in the Community’s development, the conditions and 
function of which have perhaps not yet been adequately studied.
The question suggests itself, particularly today in the late phase of the 
longest post-war boom so far, whether the economic and monetary union 
could not have been achieved earlier, before the twofold crisis, during the 
“good” years. A second question that follows on from this is whether the 
institutions of an economic and monetary union, had they existed, would 
have been strong enough to stand the storm.
There can of course be only hypothetical answers to hypothetical 
questions. But it seems likely that the problem here is specifically one of 
internal equilibrium. Michel Debré once logically enough said that a 
European consciousness would have to be formed before integration 
could be achieved. From the German side it is continually stressed, even 
today, that there has to be a common economic policy before a monetary 
union can be set up. Both arguments of course contain more than a grain 
of truth. But they ought not to be misused as “crowning points” which by 
heaping up unfulfillable preconditions block all progress. Doctrinarism, 
perfectionism or an all-or-nothing policy can never lead to success in 
integration. What is needed is to see that advances very often mutually 
condition each other. Often, therefore, what is needed is parallelism and 
also pragmatism, which must not be confused with “muddling through”.
It remains true, though, that common policies require among other 
things reciprocal training in common thinking and that Community 
institutions will break up or become ineffective if they aim at compelling 
joint action against true or presumed vital interests of individual nations.
Operating at the right level here, that is, above the lowest common 
denominator, at the point where consensus is still just possible, is a high 
art of which Jean Monnet was an unbeatable master, and to which the 
“fleet in being” of possible majority decisions is an indispensable aid.
In the early 70s the institutions of the economic and monetary union 
were not yet in place. Nor could they probably have been created, even if 
de Gaulle had not blocked developments. Too much had been placed upon 
the Community in the first fifteen years of its existence to make it possi­
ble for it to cope with this task as well. Had these institutions been estab­
lished, however, it is still more than questionable whether they would 
have been up to the crisis. Basic economic policy viewpoints and starting 
positions were too different, as were their economic interests even in the 
core countries of the Community. The long years of mutual adjustment in 
the “European monetary system”, which have since brought a consider­
able degree of convergence, were lacking at that time.
Among the happy coincidences in the history of integration is that in 
spring 1974 two men with the personal weight, practical knowledge and 
breadth and magnanimity of thought needed to lead the Community, and 
indeed the world economy, out of the crisis assumed leading roles. Their 




























































































took over the German Chancellorship from Willy Brandt, and three days 
later Valéry Giscard d ’Estaing was elected President of France.
For seven years these two men were to work together in a so far unique 
fashion. Though British resistance meant that it was not possible to get 
away again from the crippling principle of virtual unanimity, it was nev­
ertheless possible in these years to take many important decisions. Three 
of them above all had strategic political significance: agreement in 1976 
on direct elections to the European Parliament, introduction in 1979 of 
the European Monetary System and the breakthrough in 1980 over the 
question of the British contribution to financing the Community.
This is not the place to go into the much-discussed topic of what politi­
cal importance direct elections to the European Parliament have. And it is 
too early to assess the political role of Parliament and its chances for the 
future.
Obviously its powers are not yet remotely up to what would be 
appropriate for the principle of parliamentary control today, still less 
after 1992. But since there are no accepted ideas on the shape of the 
European federation or confederation, there is little conceptual clarity as 
to the future role of Parliament as well. Undeniably, it has step by step 
gained political ground. But the question of its role cannot even in the 
future be solved in a purely pragmatic fashion. The spill-over effect, it is 
true, is more than just a legend: the interaction of objective constraints 
and a certain degree of institutional manipulation can certainly bring 
about pressure in the direction of progress which can be politically irre­
sistible. But whether, with the Community’s present structure, this will 
also be true for the extension of parliamentary control seems to be ques­
tionable. Probably here too, deliberate, clear acts of policy by the gov­
ernments will continue to be necessary.
Whether this is also true of further progress in the direction of mone­
tary union might very soon become a fateful question for the Community.
The combination of free exchange rates with rapidly increasing global­
ization of money markets that the world has been living through since the 
early 70s is a potentially explosive mixture. The fact that an explosion did 
not happen is probably thanks to Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut 
Schmidt more than anyone else. They are to be thanked above all not only 
for institutionalizing the European Council but also for the world 
economic summits and for cooperation in the so-called G7.
They are also the creators of the European Monetary System. Here 
particularly Helmut Schmidt has the great merit of moving back from the 
traditional “crowning point” of the German side, that integration in 
monetary policy was the necessary precondition of a common stability- 
oriented economic policy. Without bringing this fundamentally correct 
principle into question, the German Chancellor had the courage to give 
the necessary parallelism a chance. Anyone who has followed the inflation 




























































































come closer to each other since the EMS was set up, has to admit that 
Helmut Schmidt’s calculation has been upheld until today.
Europe and the industrialized free world are at the end of the 1980s in 
a highly advanced stage of sustained economic growth and rising 
prosperity. The dangers that threaten this boom may be different from 
those of twenty years ago. But the fact that such dangers exist is obvious, 
and October 1987 proved that. The increasing globalization of markets, 
the headlong increase in the speed and volume of transactions, has not 
been met by any corresponding growth in regulatory authority. The gov­
ernments of the industrial countries remind one of drivers on a motor­
way, confident about keeping their cars under control at high speeds. 
They are right, as long as nothing happens. But when something does, 
then the braking distances prove to be too great.
Both the state of the world monetary system and the 1992 internal 
market seem to make progress in the direction of a European monetary 
union mandatory. Compared with the early 70s, the core countries of the 
Community have come considerably closer in their economic policies. 
Those who refuse gradual progress in fair weather are thus taking a grave 
responsibility upon themselves.
It will emerge here once more how much is dependent on political lead­
ership, on the role of personalities in history, so emphatically demon­
strated in the course of European integration, both positively and nega­
tively. To be sure, even political leadership cannot compel progress in the 
integration of sovereign states if the time is not ripe. But it can perceive 
opportunities which otherwise are in danger of being lost.
Obviously, the present Commission President Jacques Delors, like his 
first predecessor Walter Hallstein, is one of the personalities to whom 
leadership is given. But without collaboration by the core countries of the 
Community, the Commission’s political weight alone would be still less 
sufficient than in 1965 to bring about breakthroughs in the Community’s 
further development.
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt are no longer in office, 
and the leadership power that they developed in exemplary interaction is 
not easily replaced. Accordingly, attention inevitably turns to London, 
and the question arises whether Britain is prepared to play a part in taking 
over a leading role.
So far it would seem as if British endeavours are, apart from free 
trade, aimed more at participation and control than at leadership.
Considering the original motives for British accession, this is compre­
hensible. As has been shown, for political reasons alone Britain found it 
much harder than its continental European partners to welcome the idea 
of integration going beyond free trade. The idea of supra-nationality was 
indeed even less in line with British tradition and mentality than with 
French. Even the most “European” of all British Prime Ministers, Ed­
ward Heath, did not manage to bring about his country’s accession to the 




























































































that the Luxembourg dissent, that is, the unanimity principle, would 
remain.
But there were strong reservations about entry from economic 
viewpoints as well. The economic importance of Commonwealth prefer­
ences was admittedly declining, but the differences in agricultural policies 
heavily. The Community system of guaranteed producer prices, import 
levies and correspondingly high food prices contrasted with Britain’s low- 
priced imports, low food prices and direct subsidies to producers. At the 
same time, the United Kingdom was carrying on only barely one-third of 
its foreign trade with the Community partners, as against 50% or more in 
the case of the continental Member States.
Given this starting position, any expectation that British entry would 
give the Community a new impulse, as many advocates of British entry 
believed or claimed to believe, was unrealistic and at bottom also unfair. 
The motives for entry were ultimately political. The will to meet com­
mitments once made ought not to be doubted. But acting as a motor for 
the Community could hardly be expected of Britain, from the viewpoint 
of its perception of its own interests. To that extent its starting position 
differed fundamentally from France’s.
Initially, even the will to meet commitments made was to be faced with 
a severe test. Community financing from customs duties and agricultural 
import levies led, it emerged, to a disproportionate burden on Britain. 
This induced the new British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who had 
replaced Edward Heath following the Labour Party’s election victory in 
1974, to demand renegotiations, threatening to leave the Community if 
they were refused or were to fail.
As with France’s partners in 1963 and 1965, the Community countries 
reacted to this shock too in a mature and wise fashion. Once a pragmatic 
view had become established in London too — one of Britain’s strengths 
which can, however, sometimes lead to lack of vision — it became possi­
ble to solve the problem within the Treaty and in the context of Com­
munity procedures, step by step. The first breakthrough came about in 
1981. Economically too there was an increasingly manifest rapproche­
ment with the Continent, and therefore the fact that today London is 
among the most decisive promoters of the 1992 internal market need 
occasion no surprise.
But this commitment, for the sake of which even the réintroduction of 
the majority principle through the Single European Act was accepted, 
seems essentially to be limited to objectives of liberalization and 
deregulation, and therefore to the breaking down of barriers. By contrast, 
London does not so far seem prepared to entertain the assumption of a 
leadership role in the development of common policies.
On the contrary, Britain is continuing to shut itself off, turning into, as 
it were, the slowest ship with the strongest captain. This situation is 
disquieting. For free movement, especially if capital movement is 




























































































institutions capable of decision. A fair-weather Community that fails in 
crisis may come to cost all participants dearly. In the common internal 
market the transfer of sovereign rights to the Community bodies does not 
clash with national interest. On the contrary, that interest calls for it.
The Single European Act, the Commission white paper on the setting up 
of the internal market and most recently the Delors plan for the 
establishment of economic and monetary union have brought the Com­
munity momentum that has to be exploited as long as time lasts. How long 
that will be no one knows, since no one can predict how long the longest 
boom in post-war history will continue to last. The only thing certain is 
that once it ends everything will be that much harder. The development is 
complicated enough. Forty years of integration history have taught us that 
it is not possible to take the second step before the first one, to “brûler les 
étapes”. This is true also, and by no means least, for the infinitely com­
plex process of setting up a monetary union in a Community still very far 
from economic and social homogeneity. But, equally, the history of inte­
gration teaches us that it was often only imaginary obstacles, illusions of 
national greatness and independence, that opposed progress, blocking it 
for years if not decades. Distinguishing the real obstacles from purely 
imaginary ones calls for great wisdom and farsightedness. No example 
shows this more clearly than the changed role of the country that was the 
cradle of integration, namely France. Nobody has defended national 
sovereignty with greater conviction than the great Charles de Gaulle, yet 
no government today is a more decided proponent of economic and 
monetary union than that of his successors.
The Single European Act is a great opportunity. It has institutionalized 
the European Council. It has established European Political Cooperation 
on a treaty basis. It has given it a Secretariat and set it up at the Com­
munity’s first seat, a decision of great political importance that had been 
argued over for years. By no means least, it has strengthened Parliament’s 
role as a motor of the Community and, by extending the majority princi­
ple, it has created the institutional preconditions for setting up the internal 
market in 1992. The instruments available for integration have thus been 
fundamentally improved. Exploiting them is a question of political will. 
But this ought not to be oriented towards traditional conceptions of na- 
tion-State policy, but to the requirements of dimension and of balance in 
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